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Abstract- The Interna! Revenue Service-a sub-agency that exists 
to collect revenue-has the task of administering and enforcing a 
wide array of social policy: from subsidies Jor college and child care 
expenses, to creating jobs in depressed areas, and assisting welfare 
recipients with employment. While these new or expanded credits 
represent a new paradigm in the delivery of social policy, little is 
known about who uses these programs and, equally important, who 
does not use these programs. Understanding utilization is a key to 
understanding how effective this means of transferring income is 
and whether we are reaching the targeted populations. This paper 
provides a Jramework Jor thinking about utilization of tax credits 
among low-income individuals, supported by existing research on 
credit utilization. 
With the existing data, it appears that utilization is by Jar 
the largest Jor the EITC, possibly because it is the oldest of these 
programs, the only refundable program, and the best targeted at 
low-income individuals. Utilization is low among low-income 
individuals in sorne tax credits because low-income individuals 
are not eligible. A redesign, including reducing complexity and 
administrative burdens or making these programs refundable, 
would result in the programs reaching those that they are ostensibly 
targeted towards. 
Conditional on being eligible, one common factor associated with 
increasing participation in many of these programs is a high benefit 
to cost ratio and sophistication with the tax system, whether that 
be through the use of a paid preparer, higher education levels, or 
experience with the tax system. Policymakers should think creatively 
about reducing filing burdens to increase participation, such as 
through wider use of electronic filing. 
This is our objective-to give you the broad-based tax relief 
you deserve-to cut taxes, to increase access to health insur-
ance, and to make education more affordable. 1 can think of no 
goals that are more important as we look to provide for our 
families and to prepare America for a bright and prosperous 
new millennium. 
-William V. Roth, Jr. (R-DE), 
Senate Finance Committee Chairman, July 9, 1999 
The Wootens of Salt Lake City are one of perhaps many low-
income farnilies who probably would have not filed for the 
Earned Income Tax Credit had nota tax preparer alerted them to 
it. "We were absolutely shocked that this was available," Becky 
Wooten said. There is evidence that many low-income farnilies, 
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like the Wootens, do not participa te in the 
EITC and similar targeted tax credits that 
another EITC recipient says, "makes a 
huge difference for our family." 
-Lesley Mitchell, 
"Free Money Unclaimed," 
Salt Lake City Tribune, February 13, 2005. 
INTRODUCTION 
The political tension between embrac-ing social programs yet disdaining the 
size of government has forced politicians 
to find unique ways to appeal to voters 
interested in new spending programs 
while reducing federal spending and 
taxes. "Tax relief" is a familiar chorus, as 
politicians promote new proposals not 
through direct spending programs, as was 
done in the heyday of the Great Society, 
but through tax programs. Perhaps it is no 
surprise that, in the name of tax relief, the 
Interna! Revenue Service-a sub-agency 
that exists to collect revenue--has the task 
of administering and enforcing a wide 
array of social policy: from subsidies for 
college and child care expenses, to creat-
ing jobs in depressed areas, and assisting 
welfare recipients with employment. The 
recent "Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act 
of 2005" highlights the significance of 
these tax credits; the law outlines special 
provisions to two of the tax credits specifi-
cally targeted at low-income individuals 
as a means of relief for hurricane victims 
(U.S. Congress, 2005).1 While these new 
or expanded programs represent a new 
paradigrn in the delivery of social policy, 
little is known about who uses these pro-
grams and, equally important, who does 
not use these programs. 
Understanding utilization is a key to 
understanding how effective this means 
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 
of transferring income is and whether we 
are reaching the targeted populations. 
Utilization may be low among eligible 
taxpayers, suggesting that the goals of 
the programs are going unmet, or high 
among ineligible taxpayers, suggesting 
that government funds are being used 
in an unintended way. From a practica! 
standpoint, understanding utilization 
helps predict current and future costs of 
programs, especially when programs are 
reauthorized on a regular basis. 
The goal of this paper is to provide a 
framework for thinking about utilization 
of tax credits among low-income indi-
viduals, supported by existing research 
on credit utilization. In the second section, 
we broadly consider issues of measuring 
utilization and participation decisions 
among targeted, eligible and ineligible 
taxpayers. In the following two sections, 
we take the framework and apply it to a 
review of what we know about utilization 
in credits for individual taxpayers (third 
section) and employers (fourth section). 
One important contribution in these sec-
tions is to identify the credits that target 
low-income individuals, which is not al-
ways explicitly obvious from the statutory 
law. The shift in the provision of social 
programs through the tax system leads us 
to the fifth section, which draws upon the 
lessons of utilization learned from the wel-
fare system. With all of that background, 
the sixth section considers what utiliza-
tion should look like and suggests means 
of achieving that level of utilization. The 
seventh section concludes. 
UTILIZATION 
Before proceeding to the research on 
utilization, we begin by laying out a 
framework of conceptual and practica! 
1 The bill allows qualified individuals to calculate their eamed income tax credit and refundable child credit for 
the 2005 tax year if they reside in qualified areas and their eamed income in 2005 is below their 2004 eamed 
income. In addition, employers may claim the Work Opportunity Tax Credit for employees whose principal 
.abode was in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area as of August 28, 2005. 
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Federallncome Tax Credits for Low-lncome Families 
issues confronted in the literature. One 
straightforward measure of utilization 
among low-income individuals is the 
number of recipients and the credit dol-
lars received. These measures show the 
scope and cost of the program at a basic 
level and reflect changes in tax policy and 
environments over time. 
Further measures of utilization ad-
dress whether the income tax credits are 
targeted at low-income individuals. The 
tax credit parameters answer part of this. 
Presumably, policymakers set parameters 
for the targeted population in an effort 
to meet a set of policy goals, such as in-
creased equity, employment, savings or 
education, while also considering budget-
ary concems. To meet these goals, the tax 
credits have a set of categorical require-
ments that include: number of children, 
amount of savings, amount and type 
of education spending, welfare receipt 
status, economic status of county of resi-
dence, and work hours. Eligibility is also 
typically based on the income of the tax 
unit, again in an effort to help meet equity 
and/ or budgetary goals. The credit may 
require that income is below a threshold 
at which point the credit is phased out to 
zero. In addition, most credits are non-
refundable, such that taxpayers must have 
a mínimum amount of income to have 
tax liability for the credit to offset. The 
design of the credit defines the targeted 
population. In practice, a measure of uti-
lization that addresses whether the credit 
targets low-income taxpayers, relative to 
higher-income taxpayers, is the share of 
the credit received by low-income taxpay-
ers. However, this measure does not mea-
sure how widespread credit utilization is 
among low-income taxpayers. 
Normalizing the number of low-
income claimants by a measure of the 
low income population identifies how 
intensely low-income individuals use a 
credit. Again, this will partly reflect the 
parameters of the tax credit. That is, sorne 
low-income individuals may not receive 
the credit beca use they are ineligible due 
to insufficient income or lack of a cat-
egorical requirement such as children or 
qualifying expenses. This source of low 
participation rates may reflect program 
design to keep the costs of the credits low 
or very well-targeted. Low participation 
rates among low-income individuals may 
also reflecta failure of the credit to encour-
age intended behaviors, such as savings 
or education, because the requirements 
are too costly for low-income individu-
als to attain. The measure of utilization 
where the recipients are normalized by 
a measure of the low-income population 
also includes individuals who choose 
not to participate because the benefits of 
claiming the credit (reduced tax liability 
or refund from the IRS) exceed the cost 
of filing the credit (transaction costs as-
sociated with gaining information about 
the credit and filing the taxes, and stigma 
costs). 2 Policy parameters ha ve the ability 
to affect this source of non-particpa tion. If 
the benefits of the credit are greater than 
the costs of filing to individuals outside 
the targeted population, intentional non-
compliance with the credit will increase 
this measure of utilization. Complex rules 
may cause unintentional non-compliance 
that is also captured in this broad measure 
of credit utilization. 
Understanding the sources of participa-
tion and non-participation are significant 
for designing well-targeted credits and 
policies aimed at increasing utilization. 
For that reason, an additional measure 
of utilization is helpful-participation 
among the populations eligible for the 
credit. Empirical identification of the 
eligible population fully characterizes 
the scope of the targeted population and 
provides insights into how well a tax 
credit is designed to meet the needs of 
the low-income population. Combining 
2 See Moffitt (1983) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for models of stigma, tax compliance and filing. 
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participation decisions with information 
on eligibility provides information about 
whether the targeted group actually re-
ceives the credit. Conditional on meeting 
the categorical and income requirements, 
the targeted population may not receive 
the credits if they do not file taxes or 
claim the credit or their employer does 
not claim on their behalf. In contrast, 
identifying ineligible taxpayers who claim 
the credit sheds light on the personal and 
credit characteristics that influence non-
compliance. 
We have been purposely vague when 
talking about the population of low-
income individuals used to normalize 
the number of credit recipients, since the 
choice of population provides answers 
to different questions. Specifically, nor-
malizing by only low-income taxpayers 
is useful for understanding how existing 
tax filers na viga te the income tax system. 
In contrast, using the entire low-income 
population provides a baseline for con-
sidering the pool of potential tax-filers. 
These potential tax-filers may include 
those currently relying on the welfare 
system, whom tax credits are designed 
to encourage into the labor force. A sec-
ond issue when defining the population 
is whether to consider participation and 
eligibility over a single year or multiple 
years. When considering how well tar-
geted the credits are, "lifetime" measures 
may be more relevant. Multiple years also 
allow straightforward measurements of 
whether the tax credits encourage the 
intended behaviors. 
The data demands for estimating 
eligibility and, therefore, utilization are 
formidable and much of the research 
presented in the following sections reflects 
compromises. In fact, the choices of how 
to normalize the measures of utilization, 
described conceptually above, are often 
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 
made because of data constraints. While 
administrative data may provide precise 
estimates of the number of taxpayers 
claiming the credits, it often lacks the 
demographic and financia! information 
about the tax unit to determine eligibil-
ity. Of course, not everyone files taxes 
and so administrative data provides no 
information on the eligible who do not 
file. Survey data, which is often self-
reported, may provide essential details 
for calculating eligibility, such as income 
or spending behavior, and income tax 
decisions. However, the accuracy of these 
data is often questionable, particularly 
given the complexity of the tax system. 
The two data sources are rarely linked, 
which requires creativity in estimating 
participation rates. 
The following sections address whether 
the credits are targeted at low-income 
individuals, describe utilization of credits 
among this group and consider the find-
ings of researchers who confront measur-
ing utilization. As a caveat, we note that 
utilization, the focus of this paper, is only 
a first step in evaluating the effectiveness 
of tax credits for low-income individuals. 
A complete evaluation of effectiveness 
would include a consideration of the eco-
nomic incidence of the credits, but that is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX CREDITS-
DESCRIPTION AND UTILIZATION3 
Earned lncome Tax Credit 
Description 
The federal Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) originated in 1975 to encourage 
work, reduce unemployment and welfare 
caseloads, and to ease the burden of social 
security and self-employment taxes paid 
by low-income individuals with children 
3 Appendix Table 1Asummarizes the research on each personal income tax credit we consider. We do not directly 
address the child tax credit, adoption credit or elderly tax credit because they do not directly address social 
goals beyond, perhaps, equity and there is very little research on the utilization of these credits. 
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(Ventry, 2000). The structure of the EITC 
makes it clearly targeted at lower-in-
come individuals. Specifically, the EITC 
is refundable and available to taxpayers 
with earnings below a threshold that 
varies based on family size and marital 
status. The current EITC has three regions, 
which vary based on a taxpayer's marital 
status and number of children: a phase-in 
region, which supplements earnings at a 
rate of7.64 percent for childless taxpayers, 
34.0 percent for taxpayers with one child, 
and 40.0 percent for taxpayers with two 
or more children; a platea u region, which 
provides a constant subsidy for earnings; 
anda phaseout region, which reduces the 
credit ata rate of 7.64 percent for childless 
taxpayers, 15.98 percent for taxpayers 
with one child, and 21.06 percent for tax-
payers with two or more children. In the 
2005 tax year, taxpayers with earnings up 
to $35,263 can qualify for an EITC. 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the value of 
the EITC for three hypothetical house-
holds at various income levels: joint filer 
with two children, head-of-household 
filer with one child, and a single filer. The 
figures highlight features that make the 
credit well targeted at low-income indi-
viduals: the credit is essentially phased 
out before the median income and the 
refundability of the credit implies that 
taxpayers with income below the tax 
threshold are eligible for the maximum 
credit. 
In order to claim the credit, a taxpayer 
must fill out a two-page schedule EIC to 
identify their dependent child(ren). The 
instructions for calculating the 2004 EITC 
in the 1040 formare seven pages long, plus 
the tax tables for calculating the value 
of the credit (IRS, 2004a; IRS, 2004c). In 
addition, a 55-page IRS publication 596 
describes the EITC. 
Figure 1. Ranges of Credits for Rep resentative Married Filing Jointly, 2-Child H ouseh old, 2004 Tax 
Year 
sooo .,..----- -~§=~ ~ ~--~ ~----------------!!-~ u:a~ -~~ ~~ M 
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§ 3000 
! 2SOO 
~ 2000 
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···· · · · · · ~· ll2..,' . - ~ · ooe- .. ~~ e ·~ . 
o.. - f- jo 
.. ij·l 
~:ll 
HopeCredit 
lnoome 
Notes: Assumes the taxpayer uses the standard deduction, no other deductions or exclusions, and the alterna ti ve 
minimum tax does not apply. Assumes the taxpayer uses the maximum expenses and meets al! other eligibility 
criteria for each credit. Chart reflects that non-refundable credits are limited by tax liability, the refundable portion 
of the Child Tax Credit, and the phaseout of the education credits. The cited figure of Married Household refer to 
Married Couple Householder. 10th lncome Percentile and 20th lncome Percentile refer to all households. 
Sources: Census (2005) and authors' calculations from various IRS publications. 
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Figure 2. Ranges of Credits for Representative Head-{)f-Household Filing, 1-Child Household, 
2004 Tax Year 
~~--~~~~~~----1~a~_ ~--------~~,=~--------~ 
u •••••··· n 
4SOO ~ -
4000 ·-
lSOO 
13000 
< 
] 2SOO 
u 
2000 ----
ISOO 
1000 
Notes: Assumes the taxpayer uses the standard deduction, no other deductions or exclusions, and the alterna ti ve 
minimum tax does not apply. Assumes the taxpayer uses the maxirnum expenses and meets all other eligibil-
ity criteria for each credit. Chart reflects that non-refundable credits are limited by tax liability, the refundable 
portion of the Child Tax Credit, and the phaseout of the education credits. The cited figures refer to MaJe and 
Female Householders with no spouse present. The 10th income percentile and 20th income percentile refers to 
all households. 
Sources: Census (2005) and authors' calculations from various IRS publications. 
The EITC is not only the largest cash 
transfer program, with an estimated 
cost of $33 billion in the 2004 fiscal year, 
but it is also perhaps the best-known 
and best-studied tax credit targeted at 
lower-income individuals (OMB, 2005). 
Since its inception, the federal EITC has 
greatly expanded in size and scope, me-
chanically increasing the number of eli-
gible individuals. Additionally, 15 states, 
and the District of Columbia, currently 
operate their own EITCs based directly 
off the federal EITC or with similar fea-
tures to the federal EITC.4 At least one 
city, San Francisco, also offers an EITC 
(http: 1 1 www.sfgov.org 1 si te 1 wfc_index. 
asp?id=29174). 
Utilization Among Low-lncome lndividuals 
Estima tes 
In practice, Tables 1 and 2 show that 
100 percent of the taxpayers receiving the 
EITC have adjusted gross income (AGI) 
below $40,000, an income that represents 
less than two-thirds of all taxpayers. In 
fact, in early years, when the nominal 
income cut off for the EITC was lower, 
almost all recipients had income under 
$25,000. Note that between 40.9 percent in 
1995 and 26.3 percent in 2002 of all EITC 
' Illinois, Indiana, lowa, !<ansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin have state eamed income tax credits. Colorado also has a credit, but 
it is available only in the years when the budget is not in deficit. Virginia will begin a program in 2006. 
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Figure 3. Ranges of Credits for Representative Single Filer, No-Children Household, 2004 Tax Year 
3500 
2000 
1500 
1000 -------- -- --- -· -- -
500 
lnoome 
Notes: Assumes the taxpayer uses the standard deduction, no other deductions or exclusions, and the altemative 
minimum tax does not apply. Assumes the taxpayer uses the maximum expenses and meets all other eligibility 
criteria for each credit. Chart reflects that non-refundable credits are limited by tax liability and the phaseout of 
the education credits. The cited figures refer to Male and Female Householders with no spouse present; lncome 
Percentile refer to all households. 
Sources: Census (2005) and authors' calculations from various IRS publications. 
recipients reported fewer than $10,000 in 
AGI, representing 47.3 to 36.5 percent of 
all EITC returns, respectively. 
There is limited evidence of the dynam-
ics of EITC usage and the work under-
scores sorne of the complicated data issues 
in measuring utilization. Dowd (2005), in 
this volume, uses a sample of taxpayers 
with a child and under 65 years old from 
the 1989 to 2003 Continuous Work History 
Sample. With this very select sample of 
taxpayers who filed taxes for alllS years 
in the sample, he finds that the probabil-
ity of claiming the credit at least once is 
28 percent. Conditional on claiming the 
credit at least once, almost half of this 
15-year sample receives the credit for 
three or fewer years. Among taxpayers 
who were in the data for at least three 
consecutive years, Dowd (2005) finds evi-
dence of persistence in claiming the EITC. 
Taxpayer data alone obviously misses 
749 
the potentially important role of low-
income individuals moving in and out of 
the income tax system. Horowitz (2002) 
estimates EITC eligibility in the 1975 to 
1992 Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). In sharp contrast to Dowd (2005), 
there is no information on actual EITC 
utilization, however Horowitz shows the 
average EITC-eligible-spelllength is 3.55 
years and there is a high recidivism rate 
in eligibility (31 percent after two years 
of ineligibility). 
Several studies of the EITC focus on 
participation among the eligible popula-
tion, with most concluding that more 
than three-quarters of eligible households 
claim the credit. In widely cited estimates, 
Scholz (1994) matched information from 
tax returns to data from the 1990 Survey 
of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) and estimated that most likely 
between 80 and 86 percent of eligible 
R
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TABLEl 
SHARES OF CREDIT RETURNS BY IN COME 
YEAR 
AGIRANGE 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Eamed Income Tax Credit 
Under $10,000 47.3% 46.6% 43.9% 42.5% 41.2% 40.1% 38.7% 36.5% 
$10,000 under $25,000 51.1% 49.8% 51.8% 51.0% 51.1% 50.9% 50.4% 48.9% 
$25,000 under $40,000 1.5% 3.6% 4.4% 6.5% 7.8% 9.1% 10.9% 14.6% 
$40,000 and over 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total Returns 19,334,395 19,463,835 19,391,177 19,704,708 19,258,717 19,277,223 19,593,122 21,703,189 
Oúld Care Credit 
Under $10,000 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$10,000 under $25,000 21.6% 21.0% 19.4% 17.2% 14.9% 14.1% 14.1% 14.7% 
$25,000 under $40,000 24.5% 23.4% 20.3% 21.0% 19.9% 19.5% 19.3% 20.1% 
;ji $40,000 and over 53.9% 55.5% 60.2% 61.7% 65.2% 66.4% 66.6% 65.2% 
o 
Total Returns 5,964,251 5,974,147 5,795,532 6,128,156 6,182,192 6,368,100 6,184,506 6,185,853 
Education Credit 
Under $10,000 
- 4.0% 3.3% 3.0% 2.9% 2.0% 
$10,000 under $25,000 - - 21.2% 23.3% 23.2% 24.4% 25.4% 
$25,000 under $40,000 
- 20.5% 21.6% 21.8% 22.8% 24.5% 
$40,000 and over - 54.3% 51.8% 51.9% 49.9% 48.2% 
Total Returns o o o 4,652,597 6,436,654 6,815,315 7,212,553 6,475,135 
Retirement Savings Contribution Credit 
z 
Under $10,000 
-
0.8% ~ 
$10,000 under $25,000 
- - 38.2% o 
$25,000 under $40,000 
- - - 36.1% z )> $40,000 and over - - - 24.8% r 
Total Returns o o o o o o o 5,307,174 ~ Source: lRS, Statistics of Income, Complete Year Data, Table 2 and Table 4. X 
t... 
o 
e 
:D 
z )> 
r 
R
eproduced with perm
ission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without perm
ission.
"T1 (!) 
c. (!) 
~ 
TABLE2 :;-
SHARES OF CREDIT OOLLARS BY INCOME (') o 
YEAR 3 
AGIRANGE 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
(!) 
Eamed Income Tax Credit 
¡¡¡! 
X 
Under $10,000 40.9% 38.6% 35.4% 33.1% 33.0% 31.1% 29.0% 26.3% o 
$10,000 under $25,000 58.9% 60.6% 63.5% 65.0% 64.7% 65.9% 66.9% 67.4% ¡:¡¡ 
$25,000 under $40,000 0.2% 0.8% 1.1% 1.9% 2.3% 3.0% 4.1% 6.3% c. 
$40,000 and over 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% ~ 
Total Credit ($ thou sands) 25,955,574 28,825,257 30,388,582 31,591,791 31,901,107 32,296,342 33,375,973 38,198,572 Q 
Child Care Credit r o 
Under $10,000 0 .0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% ~ 
$10,000 under $25,000 20.7% 19.5% 18.7% 16.2% 13.4% 12.9% 12.7% 11.9% 1 :;-$25,000 under $40,000 23.8% 23.4% 19.6% 20.3% 19.8% 19.4% 19.3% 20.2% o 
$40,000 and over 55.5% 57.0% 61.7% 63.5% 66.8% 67.6% 68.1% 68.0% o ~ Total Credit ($ thousands) 2,517,963 2,531,383 2,464,005 2,660,571 2,675,147 2,793,861 2,721,062 2,706,539 3 
...... 
(!) 
"T1 
Edu cation Credit !ll 
Under $10,000 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.3% 
ª' $10,000 under $25,000 - -
18.1% 19.9% 20.7% 22.0% 18.9% ¡¡¡· 
$25,000 under $40,000 20.6% 21.8% 23.2% 24.4% 25.2% en 
$40,000 and over 60.1% 57.3% 55.2% 52.8% 55.7% 
Total Credit ($ thousands) o o o 3,376,647 4,772,444 4,851,178 5,156,253 4,882,852 
Retirement Savings Contribution Credit 
Under $10,000 0.4% 
$10,000 under $25,000 - - - 38.2% 
$25,000 under $40,000 - 40.3% 
$40,000 and over - 21.1% 
Total Credit ($ thousands) o o o o o o o 1,058,218 
Source: IRS, Statistics of lncome, Complete Year Data, Table 2 and Table 4. 
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households receive the EITC. Beca use the 
IRS automatically calculated the EITC for 
eligible tax filers until the 1991 tax year, 
all of the non-participation in 1990 is a 
result of not filing taxes. In la ter tax years, 
non-participation can also include eligible 
individuals who filed a return but did not 
claim the credit. 
Blumenthal, Erard and Ho (2005) use 
1988 data from IRS Taxpayer Compliance 
studies and the 1989 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) to estimate a participation 
rate for the EITC. They report an overall 
participation rate of between 69.4 and 
74.3 percent. For taxpayers with a legal 
obligation to file a tax return beca use their 
gross income is above the tax threshold, 
the authors estimate a participation rate 
of 89 percent, while the estimated rate was 
30.6 to 39.0 percent for those who are not 
legally obligated to file (Blumenthal et al., 
2005). In simulations of the 1999 tax year, 
they estimate a participation rate of 94.2 
percent conditional on having income 
greater than the tax threshold. The authors 
note that the low participation among 
those who are at the lowest income levels 
may suggest that the EITC is less success-
ful than traditional welfare programs in 
assisting those in need. 
Using 1996 tax year data from the CPS 
matched to tax returns, the IRS (2002c) 
estimates an EITC filer rate, or the percent-
age of EITC --eligible beneficiaries to file a 
return, of at least 64.2 percent. Holtzblatt 
and McCubbin (2004) note that the rate 
from these data could be as high as 75 or 
80 percent.5 Using the SIPP self-reported 
data about tax filing, the IRS also estima tes 
an EITC filing rate of at least 73.5. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
(2001b), which estimated the EITC-
eligible population from the CPS com-
bined with data from the IRS on the 
number of eligible EITC claims, estimated 
a 1999 participation rate of 75 percent. 
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Holtzblatt and McCubbin, (2004) caution 
that this number might be closer to 81 
percent if the GAO relaxed its assumption 
that all taxpayers who failed to appear at 
an audit were ineligible. Among house-
holds with one or two children, the GAO 
(2001) estimates very high participation 
rates of 96 and 93 percent, respectively. 
Rates for those with three or more children 
is estimated at 62.5 percent but, as Holtzb-
latt and McCubbin (2004) note, these data 
for taxpayers with three or more children 
may be less reliable because only two 
children were required for a taxpayer to 
qualify for the largest credit. Participation 
among childless taxpayers was much 
lower, at 44.7 percent. 
At least three other papers focus on 
EITC participation among the welfare 
population, a group that is likely to ha ve 
low earnings. Hill, Hotz, Mullin and 
Scholz (1999) estimated the federal EITC 
participation rate among households in 
four California counties that participated 
in a federal Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) waiver demon-
stration program. Using 1993 and 1994 
federal tax return data, matched to state 
administrative data, Hill et al. (1999) esti-
mate a participation rate between 42 and 
84 among the EITC--eligible households 
(only 21 to 53 percent of the sample is 
eligible). The wide range of participation 
estima tes reflects alterna ti ve data samples 
and difficulties implementing definitions 
of income and qualifying children in ad-
ministrative data. 
Fajnzylber (2004) also studies the 
California welfare recipient population 
using state adrninistrative data matched 
to state tax data. Among families eligible 
for the EITC and receiving welfare benefits 
between 1993 and 1999, he estima tes a par-
ticipation rate of 64 percent. This relatively 
low number is driven by the fact that only 
70 percent of the families with income in 
5 The range is based on assurnptions concerning invalid Social Security nurnbers in the CPS and those who 
refused to provide a Social Security Nurnber to the CPS interviewer. 
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the EITC range in his sample filed a tax 
retum. Of those filing, 92 percent claimed 
the EITC. 
Finally, we identified one participation 
study for a state EITC. Hirasuna and 
Stinson (2004) find an overall participa-
tion rate of 61.0 to 68.8 in the Minnesota's 
Working Family Credit among eligible 
welfare households between 1995 through 
1999. They use state welfare data merged 
with state income tax and wage data. 
To this point we ha ve shown participa-
tion-rate estimates among eligible tax-
payers between 42 and 96 percent. The 
rates on the high end are in 1990 when 
the IRS calculated the EITC for income-
eligible tax filing units, the income eligi-
bility phased out at lower incomes, and 
families without children were ineligible. 
However, even in later years estimates 
suggest a participation rate below 100 
percent because eligible tax units do 
not file taxes. Among subpopulations, 
participation is high among families 
with one or two children and low among 
welfare recipients, relative to the overall 
population. The range of estimates also 
highlights the sensitivity to using different 
data sources. 
The size of the EITC combined with 
fears of high non-compliance has at-
tracted a large literature on the utiliza-
tion of the credit by ineligible taxpayers 
(see Holtzblatt (1991), McCubbin (2000b ), 
Liebman (2000), GAO (2001), Scholz 
(1994)). When dividing the administra-
tive data on the number of 1990 EITC 
recipients by the number of households 
eligible for the EITC based on survey 
data, Scholz (1994) finds participation 
rates between 122 and 131 percent, sug-
gesting that a large number of technically 
ineligible taxpayers file for and receive the 
credit. While studies estimate that EITC 
noncompliance declined in recent times, 
perhaps due to both simplification of the 
rules goveming EITC eligibility and in-
creased enforcement, a 1999 IRS (2002b) 
estimate of EITC noncompliance puts 
the rate at 27 to 32 percent of all EITC 
claims. 
Influences 
When considering the cost-benefit deci-
sion to claim the EITC, there is consistent 
evidence that higher benefits, in the form 
of a higher EITC, all else equal, are posi-
tively correlated with claiming the EITC 
(Scholz, 1994; GAO, 2001b; IRS, 2002c; 
Blumenthal et al., 2005). 
On the cost side, characteristics associ-
ated with more time and money resources 
such as two-parent households (Hill 
et al., 1999; Scholz, 1994), fewer young 
children (Fajnzylber, 2005), number of 
children (IRS, 2002c), higher earnings 
(Scholz, 1994; IRS, 2002c), and better 
economic conditions at the county level 
(Fajnzylber, 2005) are positively correlated 
with claiming the EITC. 
Anecdotally, the cost of gaining infor-
mation about the credit is one barrier to 
utilization.6 For example, Maag (2005) re-
ports that in 2001 only 58 percent of low-
income parents in the National Survey 
of America's Families reported knowing 
about the EITC. Surveys suggest that lack 
of knowledge of the credit is systemati-
6 
'"lt allowed us the American Dream,' Julio Escobar said .... After reading about EITC in a magazine, the 
Honduran immigrant asked his tax preparer to review his returns. The result: $8,500 for three years' worth 
of credits from the IRS" (Huntley, 2005). 
"Nilsabel Rivera walked into a United Migran! Opportunity Services office on the south side one morning 
to ffie her income laxes. A few minutes la ter, the single mother of two leamed that she would receive a refund 
large enough for a down payment on a house .... Por Rivera, who was ffiing for two years, it was the first time 
she had even heard about the eamed income tax credit program. "1 was clueless. 1 just knew 1 needed to do 
my laxes," Rivera said. (Thomas-Lynn, 2003). 
"Alfredo Martinez didn't know about the Earned Income Tax Credit until he realized it meant $106 more 
in his pocket when he got his income-tax refund last year." (Markley, 2005). 
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cally correlated with low education, low 
income, and Hispanic ethnicity (Maag, 
2005; Richardson, 2002; Ross Phillips, 
2001). In an attempt to directly increase 
information, many states, large cities and 
non-profits are now running outreach 
campaigns to educate their citizens about 
the EITC. For example, the Houston As-
set Building Coalition lists "[I]ncrease 
awareness of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) among low-income work-
ing families in Houston" as one of its 
goals.7 Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
outreach campaigns increase utilization 
(Berube, 2005; Office of the Mayor, 2005; 
Children' Services Council, 2004). 
Statistically, taxpayers who are likely to 
ha ve closer ties to the income tax system, 
which represents a lower cost of filing 
or gaining information about credits, 
are more likely to claim the EITC. These 
include those who live in states with an 
income tax (Scholz, 1994), those who are 
not on public assistance (Scholz, 1994; 
IRS, 2002c) or those who have been on 
public assistance for shorter rather than 
longer time periods (Hill et al., 1999). 
One rnight expect those who are not na-
tive English speakers to have a higher 
cost of understanding and navigating 
the income tax system and, in fact, Scholz 
(1994) and Hirasuna and Stinson (2005) 
find Hispanics less likely to file for the 
EITC, even if eligible. The IRS (2002c) also 
finds a high nonfiler rate in California and 
among Hispanics. In contrast, Fajnzylber 
(2005) finds that among California welfare 
recipients, Hispanic families, as well as 
black farnilies, are more likely to both file 
a return and participate in the EITC. Like-
wise, higher education may be correlated 
with a lower cost of filing and gaining 
information, which is consistent with the 
IRS (2002c) and Hirasuna and Stinson 
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(2004, 2005) who find higher education 
positively correlated with claiming the 
EITC. However, conditional on eligibil-
ity, Scholz (1994) finds that more highly 
educated eligible taxpayers are less likely 
to report filing the EITC. 
Sorne argue that the complexity of the 
credit creates costs that lower participa-
tion in the credit (White, 2005). A recent 
literature focuses on the ability of tax 
preparation sites to lower costs of filing 
and, therefore, increase participation in 
the EITC. Ignoring the potential endo-
genity of the location of free tax prepara-
tion sites, Hirasuna and Stinson (2005) 
find that these tax preparation sites in 
higher-poverty neighborhoods in the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul area are correlated 
with greater participation in the state 
EITC program. 
Berube, Kim, Forman and Burns (2002) 
note that almost 70 percent of EITC claim-
ants rely on paid assistance to file a tax 
return and the remaining literature on 
tax-preparation focuses on paid prepar-
ers.8 Assuming that tax preparation ser-
vices are not endogenous to communities 
with large numbers of EITC-eligible tax 
filers/ Fajnzylber (2005) uses California 
administrative data to estimate that the 
addition of one tax preparation services in 
a zip code would increase the likelihood 
of filing a retum and participating in the 
federal EITC by roughly ten percentage 
points. Using their 1988 TCMP data, 
Blumenthal et al. (2005) find that tax prep-
aration services do not effectively increase 
EITC participation for eligible taxpayers. 
Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2005) use 1988 
to 1999 SOl data on states to conclude that 
the tax-preparation industry exploited 
e-filing technology, inducing low-income 
individuals to file tax returns and claim 
the EITC by providing these individuals 
7 The following is the link toa Los Angeles program: http:/ /www.eitc-la.com/ . 
8 Berube et al. (2002) point out the possible tradeoff between increased participation and lower benefits as a 
function of fees charged by the tax-preparation industry. 
9 He argues that preparation services increased in largely populated zip codes, and not necessarily in low-income 
zip codes. 
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a quick refund. They estimate that over 
the 1988 to 1999 period, a one-percent 
increase in the number of e-filing cor-
responds to a one-percent increase in the 
number of EITC claims. 
The literature on EITC noncompliance 
addresses the cost-benefit decision of in-
eligible taxpayers utilizing the credit and 
the transaction costs as a barrier to eligible 
taxpayers using the credit. McCubbin 
(2000) suggests that approximately 30 per-
cent of noncompliance in the EITC is an 
intentional decision related to improperly 
claiming children, and there also seems 
to be sorne intentional noncompliance 
associated with filing status errors and 
underreporting income. There is also 
evidence that a significant amount of EITC 
noncompliance is unintentional, resulting 
from the complexity of the tax code, the 
credit, and characteristics of low-income 
filers, such as complicated family relation-
ships and low levels of education and 
language skills (Holtzblatt and McCub-
bin, 2004). Changes to program design 
and program administration reflect an 
attempt to raise the cost of participa-
tion among non-eligible individuals, 
although they certainly ha ve the potential 
to change the costs of participation among 
eligible taxpayers as well. Despite the sim-
plification of the credit as well as increased 
enforcement, the IRS does not know if 
these efforts are effective (IRS, 2002b ). 
One such effort is the pre-certification 
program, a pilot program begun by the 
IRS during the 2004 tax filing season re-
quiring certain EITC claimants to prove 
a dependent meets the residency require-
ments to be a qualifying child prior to 
the IRS accepting an EITC claim (IRS, 
2003). Based on preliminary data, the 
pre-certification program reduced the 
amount of EITC dollars claimed by ten 
percent, especially reducing claims with 
two or more qualifying children, and 
prevented at least $4.5 million in errone-
ous EITC claims (IRS, 2005). However, the 
preliminary report could not determine 
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if the reduction in claims was a result of 
increased voluntary compliance among 
previously ineligibles or a reduction in 
participation among eligible claimants 
(IRS, 2005). 
Of all the tax credits considered in 
this paper, the EITC has by far the most 
research on all aspects of the credit. The 
remaining credits are non-refundable and 
have more categorical requirements, such 
as specific required expenses. The non-
refundability of the remaining credits also 
implies that households with particular! y 
low income, below the tax threshold, have 
no incentive to file taxes simply to claim 
the credit. There is, therefore, much less 
research for the other credits on why eli-
gible recipients do not file the credit and 
much more focus on why taxpayers are 
ineligible for the credits. 
Chíld and Dependent Care Credit 
Description 
The Child and Dependent Care Credit, 
a non-refundable credit aimed at assist-
ing individuals with dependents to work 
or look for work, was estimated to cost 
nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 2004 (OMB, 
2005). The credit is available to taxpayers 
with taxable earnings for expenses paid to 
a non-dependent individual over the age 
of 19 to care for either a dependent child 
under the age of 13 ora dependent of any 
age who is not physically or mentally ca-
pable to care for him or herself while the 
taxpayer works or looks for work. If the 
taxpayer is filing a joint retum, both the 
taxpayer and spouse must have eamed 
income unless one spouse is a full-time 
student, and eligible expenses must be 
lower than the secondary earner's income. 
Since the 2003 tax year, taxpayers can claim 
up to $3,000 of expenses per qualifying de-
pendent,foruptoamaximumof$6,000.In 
years prior to 2003, the maximum eligible 
expense was $2,400 per qualifying depen-
dent, for a total maximum of $4,800. 
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The credit is a percentage, based on 
the taxpayer's AGI, of expenses incurred 
while working or looking for work. Tax-
payers with AGI at or below $15,000 can 
claim 35 percent of expenses. The credit 
rate is reduced by one percent for each 
additional $2,000 of adjusted gross income 
until $43,000, where the credit rate reaches 
a constant and minimum rate of 20 per-
cent. The credit does not fully capture all 
expenses made for child care because pay-
ments made to providers "off the books" 
are not eligible for the credit and eligible 
expenses must be reduced by any pre-tax 
dependent care benefits (Dependent Care 
Assistance Plans).10 
Unlike the EITC, the Child Care credit 
is not specifically targeted to low-income 
individuals, although the progressive 
rate structure has the potential to benefit 
low-income individuals more. Returning 
to Figures 1 and 2, we show the value of 
the dependent and child care credit for a 
joint filer with two children and a head-
of-household filer with one child, assum-
ing the maximum child care expenses are 
paid for each child. It is striking to note 
how less well-targeted this credit is rela-
tive to the EITC for low-income taxpayers 
due to the nonrefundability. For incomes 
just above the tax threshold, the value of 
the credit is only the difference between 
the tax liability at the ten percent marginal 
tax rate and the tax threshold, implying a 
very low credit value. Although the credit 
rate is 35 percent for taxpayers with AGI 
below $15,000, the figure for joint filers 
with two children highlights that this fea-
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ture is obsolete beca use the tax threshold 
is far above $15,000. The 35-percent credit 
rate is only marginally relevant for the 
head-of-households with one child.U 
For the federal child and dependent 
care credit, taxpayers must report the 
qualifying expenses and dependents 
on a two-page Form 2441, which is ac-
companied by four pages of instructions 
(IRS, 2004e). 
Twenty-six states and the District of 
Columbia have a child and dependent 
care tax credit.12 These credits are generally 
modeled after the federal credit, with the 
credit often calculated as a share of the fed-
eral credit. However, there are sorne key 
differences that make sorne state programs 
better targeted toward lower-income 
households: sorne states have income 
limits for credit eligibility and 13 states 
have refundable credits (National Center 
for Children in Poverty, 2005). 
Utilization 
Estimates 
Tables 1 and 2 shows the utilization 
over time from SOl data. Approximately 
six rnillion returns are filed claiming the 
child care credit and the dollar value of 
the credit is around $2.5 billion for all 
the years in the tables. Beca use the credit 
is not refundable, almost no taxpayers 
claiming the credit have income below 
$10,000. With no upper-end income limit, 
by the 2000s, more than two-thirds of all 
returns filed and dollars received are by 
taxpayers with more then $40,000. 
10 These pre-tax benefits provided by an employer are essentially valued at the pre-tax dollar contribution 
amount multiplied by the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. This is less relevant for low-income individuals 
beca use even if employers offer such plans (Eiler and Hrung (2003)) report that only 30 percent of full-time 
workers in medium and large establishments were eligible for this benefit in 1997), the low-marginal tax rates 
faced by these taxpayers typically imply a low value of the Dependen! Care Assistance Plans relative to the 
taxcredit. 
11 Obviously, as a share of income, the credit value may be higher for eligible households with lower income. 
12 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New 
York, Oregon and Vermont ha ve refundable credits. Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode lsland, South Carolina and 
Vrrginia have non-refundable credits. 
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The existing literature on utilization 
of the Child and Dependent Care Credit 
among low-income individuals comes 
from studies of the progressivity of the 
credit. This research relies almost entirely 
on income tax data and finds that taxpay-
ers at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion rarely use the credit due to a lack of 
refundability. For example, Altshuler and 
Schwartz (1996) note that in a 1983 cross 
section and a ten-year panel of tax return 
data, the lack of tax liability prevented 
virtually all taxpayers with dependents in 
the first decile and half of those in the sec-
ond decile from benefiting from the credit 
even if they would have had expenses 
eligible for the child care credit. Using 
1989 income tax data, Gentry and Hagy 
(1996) find that fewer than three percent 
of families with dependents and income 
below $10,000 take the credit. Overall, 
they find that 15.7 percent of families 
with dependents claim the credit in 1989. 
Finally, with 1998 tax return data that is 
not restricted to families with dependents, 
Eiler and Hrung (2003) find that no tax-
payers in the bottom two deciles receive 
a benefit and the benefit to those in the 
third decile is minimal. 
A major limitation to using income tax 
data to estimate utilization is the inabil-
ity to establish eligibility for the credit. 
Income tax data does not include the age 
of the children, the income distribution 
within a couple, or data on child care 
expenses if the tax unit did not claim the 
credit. To address sorne of these issues, 
Gentry and Hagy (1996) use data from 
the 1989 National Child Care Survey to 
estimate usage rates. They calculate that 
overall 29.9 percent of families with an 
age-eligible child report participating in 
the credit program, with participation 
roughly increasing with income. Their 
work highlights the shortcomings of using 
survey data as well beca use they find that 
21 percent families with income below 
$5,000 report claiming the credit, which, 
given the nonrefundability of the credit, 
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suggests survey respondents are inaccu-
rate in reporting their credit receipt. Con-
ditioning on families who report working 
parents and positive child care expenses, 
just over 50 percent of those in the bottom 
third and top third of the income distribu-
tion report claiming the credit. 
Influences 
Gentry and Hagy's (1996) estimates 
using survey data suggest that there are 
eligible individuals who do not claim the 
credit. This is not the focus of their paper, 
so they do not investigate this question 
and, to our knowledge, there is little or 
no research that considers why eligible 
individuals do not file for the credit. One 
explanation addressed by Eiler and Hrung 
(2003) is that sorne families receive a larger 
tax benefit by choosing the Dependent 
Care Assistance Plans. 
Most of what we know about what 
influences the utilization of the Child and 
Dependent Care Credit reflects the labor 
force participation and child care choices 
of families that make them eligible for the 
credit, rather than a decision of eligible 
families to file for the credit. Usage among 
low-income households is low because 
these taxpayers are not categorically eli-
gible for the credit. Specifically, they do 
not have dependent children under the 
age of 13 or other qualifying dependents, 
they do not have qualifying child care 
expenses or they do not have two-earner 
families. Altshuler and Schwartz (1996), 
for example, find that fewer than 30 per-
cent of 1983 taxpayers in the bottom two 
AGI deciles claim dependents. Gentry 
and Hagy (1996) find similar results using 
1989 tax data. 
Using the NCCS survey data that in-
eludes data on children's ages, child care 
expenses and earnings of both spouses 
in a couple, Gentry and Hagy (1996) find 
results consistent with tax data: farnilies 
with low incomes do not use the tax credit 
beca use they have zero tax liability. They 
also find that the low-income families 
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are less likely to be eligible for the credit 
beca use they do not work or do not ha ve 
qualifying child care expenses. A small 
share of low-income families are ineli-
gible beca use their child care expenses are 
above the secondary earner's income. 
Single parents are more likely to claim the 
credit, conditional on income, probably 
reflecting the work requirement (that is, 
both spouses in a married couple must 
work). Conditional on having a child un-
der the age of 13, families are more likely 
to utilize the credit if they have younger 
children, the mother is more educated, the 
family has fewer children, and the family 
uses child care centers or family da y care 
centers for their child care. Again, these 
characteristics primarily reflect labor mar-
ket and child care decisions that would 
make the family eligible for the credit. 
Education Credits 
Description 
The 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act created 
two non-refundable tax credits for re-
quired tuition and fees for post-secondary 
education: the HOPE Credit and the Life-
time Learning Credit. Each eligible stu-
dent may only claim one education credit 
in a tax year. The HOPE tax credit, which 
is only available for the first two years 
of post-secondary education, provides 
a lOQ-percent credit on the first $1,000 of 
required tuition and fees and a 5Q-percent 
credit on the second $1,000, for a total 
maximum credit of $1,500. The Lifetime 
Learning Credit is, in contrast, available 
for an unlimited number of years, includ-
ing graduate work. Until the 2003 tax year, 
the credit was equal to 20 percent of $5,000 
of required tuition and fees, for a total 
maximum credit of $1,000. Beginning in 
the 2003 tax year, the credit was equal to 
20 percent of $10,000 of required tuition 
and fees, for a total maximum credit of 
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$2,000 (Fitzpatrick and Maag, 2003). One 
important difference between the credits 
is that each eligible student in the tax unit 
may claim the HOPE credit, while the 
Lifetime Learning Credit is computed for 
the entire tax unit. The OMB (2005) esti-
mates the Hope Credit cost at $3.3 billion 
in 2004 and the Lifetime Learning Credit 
cost at $2.2 billion. 
To claim either credit, a taxpayer fills 
out Forro 8863, where they are respon-
sible for reporting the eligible student 
and expenses (IRS, 2004f). Two pages 
of instructions describe the eligibility 
requirements. 
There are at least three reasons why 
the credits may not be well targeted at 
low-income taxpayers. First, like the 
Child and Dependent Care Credit, the 
education credits are non-refundable. 
The by-now-familiar Figures 1 through 
3 show the effect of non-refundability, 
which has the same effect on the credit 
value as the Child and Dependent Care 
credit for our hypothetical families. What 
is not obvious in these figures is that tak-
ing one credit may preclude taking others 
for households that are eligible to claim 
multiple credits, if the credits reduce 
tax liability to zero. Second, while both 
education credits ha ve inflation-adjusted 
income limitations, the maximum income 
is well above the median income. In 2004 
both credits are phased out by one percent 
for each additional $100 in AGI between 
$85,000 and $105,000 for joint filers and 
between $42,000 and $52,000 for singles 
and head-of-households (IRS, 2004f)Y 
Third, students cannot count required 
tuition and fees paid with non-taxable 
funds, such as scholarships and grants, 
but they can count required tuition and 
fees paid with loaned funds. As a result, 
students from low- and moderate-income 
families who qualify for the federal Pell 
Grant or similar state means-tested grant 
programs may receive little or no benefit 
13 Figures 1 through 3 also illustrate how different phaseout ranges are for joint filers relative to others. 
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for the education credits, while wealthier 
students who receive student aid through 
various government subsidized loan pro-
grams can receive larger credits. 
Utilization 
Estima tes 
Tables 1 and 2 show the utilization of 
the education credits o ver time. In the 1998 
tax year, the first year that the credits were 
available, the IRS reports that 4.6 million 
returns claimed an education credit. Since 
that time, the number of returns claim-
ing an education credit has grown to 7.4 
million in the 2003 tax year, according to 
preliminary data from the IRS (Balkovic, 
2005). Table 2 shows the credit is not 
heavily utilized by low-income taxpay-
ers. Around half of all returns filing for 
an education credit have AGI in excess of 
$40,000 and more than half of the credit 
dollars accrue to this group. 
Using the IRS Master File in the 2000 tax 
year, Long (2004) finds evidence consistent 
with Tables 1 and 2: only one percent of tax-
payers with AGI less than $1 O ,000 claimed 
a credit, while 12.43 percent of those 
taxpayers with AGI between $75,000 and 
$100,000 claimed a credit. The evidence 
from survey data provides a different 
denominator as a comparison group. Us-
ing data from the National Postsecondary 
Student Aid Survey (NPSAS) from 1999 
to 2000, the GAO (2002b) estimated that 
40 percent of all college undergraduates 
received an education tax credit, but only 
four percent of all dependent undergradu-
ates and nine percent of all independent 
undergraduates with family incomes less 
than $20,000 received the credit.14 
Conditional on being eligible for the 
credits, there is a wide range of partid-
pation rate estimates. The GAO (2002), 
using the 1999 to 2000 NPSAS, assumed 
that approximately 90 percent of under-
graduates eligible for a credit claimed 
one, and found this assumption produced 
an estimate of the cost of the education 
credits that was 94 percent of the actual 
IRS estimate. However, they acknowl-
edged that there is no reliable data on the 
rate that those eligible for the HOPE and 
Lifetime Learning Credits claim the credit 
because no dataset includes tax return 
information, post-secondary enrollment 
and degree information, and receipt of 
federal student aid programs, all of which 
are required to accurately assess eligibil-
ity (GAO, 2002b)Y A survey matched 
with administrative financia! aid data 
of a 3,985 randomly selected University 
of California (UC) students conducted 
in 2000 by Hoblitzell and Smith (2001) 
also estima tes a relatively high education 
credit participation rate: 78 percent for the 
1999 tax year. Specifically, 37 percent of 
UC students were eligible and 29 percent 
report using a credit. Forty-five percent 
of those claiming the credit carne from 
families with less than $60,000 in annual 
income and 22 percent carne from families 
with less than $20,000. 
Long (2004) notes that UC students tend 
to be wealthier than the national average, 
making it difficult to generalize from the 
Hoblitzell and Smith (2001) study. Using 
the 1999-2000 NPSAS, Long (2004) esti-
mates that 43 percent of all undergradu-
ates are eligible for an educational credit, 
but less than a third of eligible students 
acknowledged during the telephone in-
terview portian of the NPSAS that they 
or their parents claimed the credit. Using 
two definitions of eligible students, she 
14 Moreover, undergraduates with family incomes of less than $20,000 also received a smaller average credit 
than those with higher family incomes. 
15 The NPSAS has good irúormation on enrollment, degree, and eligible expenses, but relies on self-reported or 
imputed data on income for students who do not apply for financia! aid. Also, beca use the Lifetime Learning 
Credit is based on returns the Hope is based on students, it is difficult to accurately assess eligibility without 
making it household tax irúormation, including income. Finally, income and tuition irúormation are based on 
the academic year, while tax eligibility relies on the tax year. 
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consistently finds that slightly fewer than 
30 percent of all eligible students claimed 
a credit, with dependent undergraduates 
having the lowest participation rate of all 
students, at approximately 20 percent. 
Long (2004) also notes that in the IRS Mas-
terfile, almost 3,000 taxpayers with income 
over the income limit claimed the credit, 
suggesting utilization among ineligible 
taxpayers or simply errors in the data. 
Studies of the education credits show 
a very wide range of participation rates 
among eligible taxpayers, including fewer 
than 30 percent up to 78 percent. As in the 
EITC estimates, the range of estimates 
highlights the sensitivity to using differ-
ent data sources. The highest rates are 
those using administrative data on the 
number of filers, while the rates at the low 
end are based on self-reported tax credit 
information. 
Influences 
Eligibility clearly influences utilization. 
Like the literature on utilization of the 
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit 
there is sorne focus on taxpayers not fil-
ing beca use they are not eligible. Both the 
GAO (2002) and Long (2004) find students 
were often ineligible for the credits dueto 
the income limitations of the credit or lack 
of tax liability. 
In addition, there is evidence that the 
larger the benefit is of filing the credit, the 
more likely a taxpayer is to file. Specifical-
ly, in the California survey data, Hoblitzell 
and Smith (2001) find that eight percent 
of main-campus students who did not 
claim a credit reported that the credit 
amount was too small to be worthwhile. 
Long (2004) notes that utilization is posi-
tively correlated with attending four-year 
institutions, holding independent status, 
living in states with higher tuition bur-
dens, and relying on federal financia! 
aid programs to finance education, all of 
which are correlates to higher tuition costs 
as a share of income and, therefore, higher 
benefits of the credit. 
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lnformation costs may be a large factor 
in non-filing. Long (2004) finds that only 
33 percent of eligible parents in the 1999 
National Household Education Survey 
reported knowledge of either credit. 
Characteristics positively correlated with 
awareness of the credit include income, 
education of the parent, children closer 
to college age, non-minority status and 
graduate-student status. Hoblitzell and 
Smith (2001) find that 59 percent of 
non-filers did not claim the credit beca use 
they believed they were ineligible and 27 
percent of all non-filers said they were 
unaware of the credit. As sorne confirma-
tion to the misinformation about the credit, 
the survey data show that most students 
believe they are ineligible because their 
income was too high, yet the administra-
tive data indicates that most students were 
ineligible because of the non-taxable aid 
restriction. Presumably due to concerns 
about information, the University of 
California system provided additional 
information to assist their students in 
claiming the federal credits, including de-
tailed information about their educational 
finances as well as a brochure about the 
credits (Holitzell and Smith, 2001). There 
is no evidence that we know of about 
whether these policies are successful. 
Long (2004) also finds that demograph-
ics associated with lower costs of filing or 
gaining information about the credit are 
positively correlated with eligible taxpay-
ers filing the credit. These include being 
married, being a dependent or having a 
parent with sorne college experience. Long 
(2004) also finds that eligible female and 
white students were more likely to claim 
the credit than male students and students 
from other racial groups. 
Saver's Credit 
Description 
The Retirement Saver's Contribution 
Credit, "Saver's Credit," began in 2001 
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and is scheduled to expire in 2006. The 
goal is to provide incentives for low- to 
moderate-income households to save for 
retirement and to provide an altemative 
to the structure of most other retirement 
savings incentives that tend to benefit 
higher-income workers (Cale, lwry and 
Orszag, 2004). The credit is a nonrefund-
able tax credit for contributions of up to 
$2,000 (not indexed for inflation) made to 
an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) 
or an employer-defined contribution 
plan for households with low to moder-
ate incomes. Joint filers with AGI (not 
indexed for inflation) of up to $50,000, 
head-of-household filers with up to 
$37,500 in AGI, and single filers with AGI 
of up to $25,000 can receive a credit up to 
50 percent of their contribution. For joint 
filers, each spouse may claim the credit. 
The percentage phases down quickly from 
50 percent to ten percent between AGI of 
$30,000 to $32,501 for joint filers, $22,500 to 
$24,376 for head-of-household filers and 
$15,000 to $25,000 for single filers.16 In an 
effort to prevent taxpayers from moving 
money into an account only to claim the 
credit, the IRS reduces the amount of the 
credit if the taxpayer received distributions 
from certain pension and IRAs. The contri-
bution eligible for the credit is reduced by 
distributions received in the tax year for 
which the credit is claimed, the two pre-
ceding tax years, and in the period after the 
end of the tax year, but before the due date 
for filing the retum. This constraint may 
be particularly relevant for low-income 
taxfilers who are more likely to be liquidity 
constrained and rely on savings income. 
The OMB (2005) estima tes that the Saver's 
Credit cost $970 million in 2004. 
By now, the lines in Figures 1, 2 and 3 
are not surprising. The nonrefundability 
of the credit does not allow taxpayers with 
income below the tax threshold to utilize 
the credit. Nonrefundability, combined 
with the marginal tax rate parameters and 
the credit phaseout lead to a quirk in the 
credit's design. Note that for the head-
of-household and single taxpayers in our 
figures, the maximum credit of $1,000 (50 
percent of a $2,000 contribution) is never 
attainable because their tax liability over 
the range where the 50--percent credit is in 
place is always below $1,000.17 Likewise, 
joint filers can never attain the maximum 
$2,000 credit. 
To file for this credit, a taxpayer must 
list qualifying savings contributions for 
their family on the single-page Form 8880 
(IRS, 2004d), which is accompanied by a 
single page of instructions. 
Utilization 
Estima tes 
Tables 1 and 2 show that in 2002, the first 
year of the credit, there were 5.3 million 
retums that claimed the saver's credit, at 
a cost of approximately $1.1 billion. Once 
taxpayers have reached the tax threshold, 
the rapid phaseout rate of the credit en-
sures that lower-income families receive 
more of the credit: 75 percent of the retums 
and 80 percent of the credit dollars accrue 
to taxpayers with AGI below $40,000. 
The literature on utilization of the 
Saver's Credit focuses a great deal on the 
design features that make low-income 
16 For joint filers with AGI $0 to $30,000, the rate is 50 percent; 30,001 to $32,500, 20 percent; and $32,501 to 
$50,000, ten percent. 
17 For example, in 2004 a head-of-household filer with one child has a standard deduction of $7,150 and two 
personal exemptions of $3,100 for a tax threshold of $13,350. A head-of-household taxpayer with $22,000 of 
income, still in the maximum 50-percent credit range, has taxable income of $8,650 ($22,000-$13,350). With 
a marginal tax rate of ten percent, the tax liability is $865, well below the maximum tax credit of $1,000. The 
maximum tax credit is never available to head-of-households. The same is true for single filers. In 2004 the 
tax threshold is $7,950 ($4,850 standard deduction plus the $3,100 personal exemption). With income in the 
maximum credit range and, therefore, a marginal tax rate of 10 percent, their tax liability is always below the 
credit amount. 
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individuals ineligible for the credit. Bur-
man, Gale, Hall and Orszag (2004) use 
an Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
microsimulation model to conclude 
that in 2004 approximately five percent 
of all filing units would use the credit 
with the benefits spread roughly evenly 
between the second, middle, and fourth 
cash income quintiles.18 However, only 
0.2 percent of the lowest cash income 
quintile would receive a benefit. In simu-
lations with refundability added to the 
creditstructure,thelowestquintilewould 
receive 15 percent of the benefits, the sec-
ond quintile, 38 percent, and the middle 
quintile, 34 percent. Orszag and Hall 
(2003), using the same Tax Policy Center 
model, estimate that only 20 percent of 
those income eligible, in the 2003 tax 
year, would receive any benefit from the 
tax credit if they contributed to an IRA 
or 401(k), and only 0.1 percent of those 
income eligible would receive the maxi-
mum $1,000 credit if they contributed the 
$2,000 maximum. 
Koenig and Harvey (2005) in this vol-
ume use actual tax return data to estimate 
utilization in the first year of the Saver's 
Credit. They use 2002 Statistics of Income 
data that is linked to W-2, and other 
tax forms that provide information on 
eligible savings contribution, to estimate 
the utilization of the Saver's Credit. They 
identify a sample of taxpayers that meet 
the following categorical requirements for 
the credit: at least age 18 years old, not a 
student,I9 not a dependent. In estimating 
utilization, the authors assume that those 
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 
who report receiving the credit are eligible 
for the credit, even if their methodology 
does not show the individual as eligible, 
under the assumption that there are 
data errors that prevent them from cor-
rectly identifying all eligible individuals. 
Conditioning on positive tax liability in 
this group reduces the number of filers 
potentially eligible for the Saver's Credit 
by 40 percent. Overall, they estimate 
14.2 percent of these categorically and 
income-eligible filers take the credit, 
with the utilization rate highest among 
heads-of -households. Further restricting 
the sample of filers who made contribu-
tions to a retirement account, the authors 
estima te that 66 percent of these tax filers 
took the credit. 
Brady and Hrung (2005) find that the 
so called "anti-churning rule," which re-
duces contributions eligible for the Saver's 
Credit by the amount of IRA and 401(k) 
distributions during the contribution year 
and the prior two years, reduces by up to 
18 percent the number of taxpayers that 
otherwise fully qualify for the credit and 
have eligible contributions. Overall, they 
find that approximately 55 percent of all 
eligible taxpayers take the credit.20 
Influences 
"Ineligibility because the credit is not 
refundable" is one explanation for why 
low-income individuals do not use the 
Saver's Credit. Another explanation for 
potentially low utilization is that low-
income taxpayers do not save in tax-
deferred retirement savings plans. Koenig 
18 The tax model uses 1999 SOl data, 2000 CPS along with the Survey of Consumer Finances and SIPP. 
19 They cannot distinguish full- from part-time students, and only full-time students are ineligible. However, 
even assuming all students were eligible for the saver's credit does not change their estimates greatly. 
20 However, they do not categorize al! those that take the credit as eligible. Specifically, they categorize about 
600,000 taxpayers who took the credit (about 11.5 percent of taxpayers with a credit) as ineligible. If, in fact, 
these taxpayers are incorrectly coded as ineligible, and their number is added to both the numerator and 
denominator, the take-up rate would increase to 58 percent. The authors are only able to identify taxpayers 
as students if they took the HOPE or Lifetime Learning Credits. As such, they may be overestimating the 
eligible population and underestimating the take-up rate. The difference in estimated take-up rates between 
Brady and Hrung (2005) and Keonig and Harvey (2005) may be due in part to their methods of identifying 
full-time students. 
762 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Federallncome Tax Credits for Low-lncome Familias 
and Harvey (2005) show that fewer than 
13 percent of taxpayers in the first three 
AGI deciles save in tax deferred savings 
plans. Brady and Hrung (2005) show that 
of the taxpayers who would have quali-
fied for a Saver's Credit in 2001 (the year 
before the credit was in effect) based on 
the criterion of age, AGI, and the presence 
of eamings (but without regard to having 
positive tax liability), fewer than 25 per-
cent contributed toan IRA ora 401(k)-type 
plan.21 The authors also find that, at least 
in its first year, the credit does not appear 
to have greatly increased the number of 
low-income individuals contributing to 
retirement accounts: nearly 80 percent of 
those who took the credit in 2002 had con-
tributed to a retirement account in 2001. 
The benefit of the credit appears to 
influence the utilization of the credit. Koe-
nig and Harvey (2005) show that eligible 
non-claimants are eligible for smaller 
credit amounts than eligible claimants, 
although the credit for those who should 
have claimed the credit is quite significant. 
A large randomized field experiment 
among H&R Block clients in the low- and 
middle-income St. Louis neighborhoods 
during the 2005 tax filing season (Duflo, 
Gale, Liebman, Orszag and Saez, 2005) 
also sheds light on the how the design of 
the credit may affect participation. The 
authors, in conjunction with H&R Block, 
offered matching contributions in addi-
tion to the Saver 's Credit to savings of zero 
percent, 20 percent or 50 percent at the 
time of tax preparation. They found that 
the match rate had a large and positive ef-
fect on take-up of the IRA contribution. 
Given that all the data used to date on 
the utilization of the Saver 's Credit is from 
the first year of the credit, lack of informa-
tion about the credit may be an important 
influence for those not using the credit. As 
support for this hypothesis, Brady and 
Hrung (2005) show that tax payers using 
paid preparers are much more likely to 
claim the credit than those filing their own 
taxes. Koenig and Harvey (2005) find that 
eligible taxpayers who claimed the credit 
were more likely to use a professional 
tax preparer or a computer software pro-
gram to complete their returns than those 
eligible taxpayers who did not claim the 
credit. Duflo et al. (2005) find that take-up 
of the matching IRA contribution was 
strongly related to the specific tax profes-
sional who worked with the client. They 
also find that take-up of the IRA for those 
eligible for the Saver's Credit was only 
slightly higher than for those not eligible, 
which the authors believe may be related 
to the complexity of the rules governing 
the Saver's Credit. 
As in the case with other credits we 
have considered, those individuals facing 
lower costs of filing seem more likely to 
utilize the credit. Duflo et al. (2005) find 
that take-up was also higher for married 
filers and increased with income. 
EMPLOYER-CLAIMED INCOME TAX 
CREDITS22 
The Federal tax system also has a 
number of credits targeted at low-income 
individuals through employers of low-
income individuals. Generally there are 
two types: (1) the categorically targeted, 
i.e., those that target hiring specific types 
of employees, typically those who re-
ceived govemment aid; and (2) the geo-
graphically targeted, i.e., those that target 
the hiring of employees from a geographi-
21 Using 1996 Statistics of Income (SOl) data linked to information from W-2 forms, Joulfaian and Richardson 
(2001) find that participation in eligible savings is relatively low for single-eamer households, households 
with dependents, lower-wage eamers, those with smaller amounts of non-labor income or those who face 
lower marginal tax rates. The Congressional Budget Office (2003}, using 1997 tax data, found that utilization 
of tax-deferred retirement plans was substantially less likely for workers with lower levels of adjusted gross 
income. 
22 Appendix Table 2A summarizes the research on each employer-claimed income tax credit. 
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cal region that has high poverty and un-
employment rates. The employers can be 
corporations or individual taxpayers with, 
for example, sole proprietorships. 
Categorical/y Targeted Employer-
C/aimed Tax Credits 
Description 
The largest of the credits that targets 
specific types of employers is the Work 
Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), which 
began in 1996 and was recently extended 
to include wages paid in 2005. The WOTC 
requires employees to be certified with a 
state employment security agency (SESA) 
beforestartingworkbyeither (1) receiving 
certification from the SESA on the da y the 
employee begins work or (2) completing 
a request for certification (IRS, 2002a) 
on or before the employer makes the 
job offer and subrnitting the form by the 
21 •• day after the individual begins work 
(IRS, 2004g). Eligible employees for the 
WOTC include: vocational rehabilitation 
referrals; economically disadvantaged 
youth, which are defined as 18- to 
24-year-olds who live in an Empower-
ment Zone, an IRS-specified Enterprise 
Community, or hail from a farnily that cur-
ren ti y or recently received food stamps; 
economically disadvantaged Vietnam 
veterans; Supplemental Security Income 
recipients; econornically disadvantaged 
former convicts; and workers who have 
received AFDC or Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) for at least 
nine of the previous 18 months. Certified 
employees must work a mínimum of 120 
hours and the credit rate is 25 percent of 
wages for work up to 400 hours. If the 
employee works more than 400 hours, 
a 40 percent subsidy rate applies up to 
a maximum of $6,000 in wages, result-
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 
ing in a maximum credit of $2,400 (IRS, 
2004g)Y 
When filing taxes, the employer claims 
the WOTC for all certified employees by 
reporting the number of qualified em-
ployees and their hours on Form 5884, 
a single-page form with two pages of 
instructions (IRS, 2004h). The OMB (2005) 
estimated the WOTC cost to be $205 mil-
lion in the 2004 fiscal year. 
The Small Business Job Protection Act 
established the WOTC in order to improve 
upon its predecessor, the Targeted Job 
Tax Credit (TJTC), which existed from 
1978 until the end of 1994. The TJTC had 
a more generous credit rate of 40 or 50 
percent and defined at-risk youth some-
what differently-as 19- to 23-year-olds 
who were in farnilies earning less than 70 
percent of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
lower living standard for each of the last 
six months Goint Committee on Taxation, 
1996). The goal in updating the TJTC to 
the WOTC was to " ... [create a] program 
whose design will focus on individuals 
with poor workplace attachments, stream-
line administrative burdens, promote 
longer-term employment, and thereby 
reduce costs relative to the prior-law 
program Goint Committee on Taxation, 
1996, 97)." 
The Tax Reform Act of 1997 created a 
second large-scale employer tax credit 
aimed at low-income individuals-the 
Welfare to Work (WtW) Program-as a 
way to encourage firms to hire long-term 
welfare recipients. Firms are eligible to 
receive a credit for 35 percent of wages 
paid in the first year of employment and 
50 percent in the second year (for the first 
$10,000 in wages, resulting in a maximum 
credit of $8,500 for both years) for a certi-
fied employee who works at least 400 
hours. Certifiable employees must have 
received TANF for at least 18 consecutive 
23 Prior to the Tax Reform Act (TRA) 1997, the credit required eligible employees to work a minimum of 400 
hours and paid 35 percent ofwages up lo $6,000 for a maximum credit of$2,100 Qoint Committee on Taxation, 
1996). Also the age requirement for at-risk youth was 25. 
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months prior to being hired, have become 
ineligible for assistance from the state or 
federal government or belong to a family 
that received TANF for any 18-month 
period after August 1997 and within 
two years of being hired (IRS, 2004g).24 
The certification process is identical to 
the process for the WOTC. To claim the 
credit an employer must file form 8861, 
a single-page form with two pages of in-
structions requiring the employer to report 
the total amount of qualified first-year 
and second-year wages paid to qualified 
employees (IRS, 2004i). The program was 
recently extended to include wages paid 
for employees starting work in 2004. OMB 
(2005) estima tes a $60 million tax expendi-
ture in 2004 for the WtW credit. 
Utilization 
Estima tes 
Tables 3 and 4 show the utilization of 
the WOTC and WtW over time. Of course, 
there is no need to show the share claimed 
on behalf of low-income individuals 
because the credits explicitly require 
low-income individuals to be the targets. 
The Tables show a large increase in the 
number of returns filed (particular! y those 
filed by individuals) and credit amounts 
(particularly those filed by corporations) 
since the inception of the WOTC. By 2002, 
the utilization of the WOTC is comparable 
in return and dollars to the last year of 
the TJTC. The WtW credit has also seen 
dramatic growth in the utilization; five 
years after its enactment, the credit dollars 
have increased almost five fold. 
Research on the utilization of the cat-
egorically targeted employer-claimed tax 
credits has two dimensions. One is the 
firm' s utilization decision and the second 
is the number of individuals affected by 
firms utilizing the credit. 
Because the firm ultimately decides 
whether to file for the credit, we begin 
with estimates of firm utilization. IRS 
data show that in 1999, about one out 
of 790 corporations and one out of 3,450 
individuals with a business affiliation 
reported the WOTC on their tax retums 
(GAO, 2002a). These dramatically low 
participation rates are even smaller than 
those for the former TJTC. Using a De-
partment of Labor 1979 and 1980 survey 
of 5,859 firms, Bishop and Montgomery 
(1986) find that while 13 percent of firms 
that reported knowledge of the TJTC 
claimed the credit, only 2.25 percent of all 
firms surveyed claimed the TJTC. Bishop 
and Kang (1991) also find dramatically 
low participation rates for the TJTC, using 
a Gallup survey, designed by the National 
Center for Research in Vocational Educa-
tion, of 3,412 firms. Bishop and Kang 
(1991) estímate that participation was 4.3 
percent in 1980, 3.5 percent in the first part 
of 1981, and only 2.7 percent for the end 
of 1981/beginning of 1982. 
While these estimates are shockingly 
low, the target of these programs is the 
eligible employees, not the employer. For 
this reason, although ultimately the firm 
decides whether to file for the WOTC, the 
goal of the program is arguably to provide 
jobs for as many of the eligible population 
as possible. For this reason, participation 
rates among eligible employees may be a 
more meaningful participation rate. 
Hamersma (2003) estima tes the partici-
pation rate of the targeted population in 
the WOTC and WtW credits. She focuses 
on participation rates among those meet-
ing the welfare eligibility criteria because 
identifying other eligible groups, such 
as ex-felons, is impossible in survey 
data. The numerators are the number 
of employees certified for the WOTC or 
WtW by the Department of Labor. The 
number of employees certified may ex-
ceed the number subsidized due to the 
mínimum hours worked requirement, 
24 The WtW credit cannot be claimed for wages that ha ve airead y been used to claim the WOTC or Empower-
ment Zone credits. 
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TABLE3 
EMPLOYER TAX RETURNS: TAX YEARS 19%-2003 
(All Figures Are Estimates Based on Samples) 
TaxYear 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
!te m (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All individual retums 118,218,327 120,351,208 122,421,991 124,770,662 127,075,145 
All corporate retums 4,474,167 4,631,370 4,710,083 4,848,888 4,935,904 
Work opportunity tax credit 
Individual N / A 5,290 7,304 7,823 8,483 
Corporate N/A 671 2,653 2,000 2,086 
Total NIA 5,961 9,957 9,823 10,569 
Welfare to work tax credit 
Individual NIA N/A "35 2,349 1,549 
Corporate NIA N / A ·s 538 1,082 
Total NIA NIA o 2,887 2,631 
jobs credit' 
Individual 18,613 N / A N/ A N/ A N/ A 
Corporate 2,910 N / A NIA N! A N / A 
Total 21,523 N / A NIA NIA NIA 
Empowerment zone credit 1 
Individual 239 460 686 3,100 4,752 
Corporate 193 464 630 402 420 
Total 432 924 1,316 3,502 5,172 
Tentative empowerment zone credit1 
Individual 250 461 849 3,105 4,757 
Corporate 330 697 861 539 587 
Total 580 1,158 1,710 3,644 5,344 
Notes: 
N / A- No! applicable; U- Unavailab1e al time of publicatíon. 
• Estimate should be used with caution dueto small number of sample retums it is based on. 
1For Tax Years 2002 and 2003, the empowerment zone credit data includes the renewal community employment credit. 
2Represents prior year returns included in the 1995 individual income retums statistics. 
Source: Statistics of Income Division, personal correspondence. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
129,373,500 130,255,237 130,076,443 130,423,626 
5,045,274 5,135,591 5,266,607 NIA 
8,301 9,988 17,690 17,150 
2,297 1,789 1,752 u 
10,598 11,777 19,442 u 
2,936 3,058 3,615 3,535 
986 678 785 u 
3,922 3,736 4,400 u 
N/A NIA N! A N / A 
N/ A N / A N / A N / A 
N/ A N / A NIA NIA 
5,073 6,745 17,250 22,553 
479 559 1,657 u 
5,552 7,304 18,907 u 
5,100 
675 
7,627 19,564 25,539 z 
795 2,544 u !i 
5,775 8,422 22,108 u o 
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TABLE4 5" EMPLOYER TAX CREDIT AMOUNTS: TAX YEARS 1995--2003 (') 
(All Figures Are Estima tes Based on Samples; Money Amounts Are in Thousands of Dollars) o 3 
Tax Year (1) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 ¡¡;! 
ltem (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) X () 
Work opportunity tax credit m 
Individual NIA 8,473 15,436 29,044 32,197 30,406 33,151 55,029 54,865 o. 
Corporate N / A 6,896 118,757 232,675 221,678 235,689 207,201 216,235 u ~ 
Total NIA 15,369 134,193 261,719 253,875 266,095 240,352 271,264 u O' 
Welfare to work tax credit ..... 
Individual N / A N/A *55 2,587 5,335 10,595 16,269 14,593 13,117 r o 
Corporate NIA NIA *51 18,185 77,357 91,973 97,891 102,419 u :E 
Total N /A NIA o 20,772 82,692 102,568 114,160 117,012 u 1 5" )obs credit' (') 
Individual 38,992 N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A NIA o ~ 3 O'> Corporate 174,361 N / A N / A N! A N /A NI A N / A N / A N / A 
~ (1) Total 213,353 N / A NIA N! A N /A N / A NIA N! A N / A 
"Tl 
Empowerment zone credit1 ¡u 
Individual 8,497 10,810 19,091 22,088 26,728 21,948 24,274 61,262 83,449 
ª' Corporate 7,409 
9,382 13,223 19,118 21,645 23,527 23,401 59,695 u ¡¡¡· 
Total 15,906 20,192 32,314 41,206 48,373 45,475 47,675 120,957 u (J) 
Tentative empowerment zone credit1 
Individual 9,489 11,863 23,047 27,488 31,469 42,468 38,763 101,247 157,672 
Corporate 10,684 21,532 36,694 36,647 44,181 56,259 64,073 146,014 u 
Total 20,173 33,395 59,741 64,135 75,650 98,727 102,836 247,261 u 
Notes: 
N 1 A - Not applicable; U · Unavailable at time of publica !ion. 
• Fstimate should be used with caution dueto small number of sample retums it is based on. 
'For Tax Years 2002 and 2003, the empowerment zone credit data includes the renewal community employment credit. 
'Represents prior year retums included in the 1995 individual income retums s tatistics. 
Source: Statistics of lncome Division, personal co rrespondence. 
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yet the number of subsidized employees 
is not collected by the government. Us-
ing the SIPP, she calculates the number 
of eligiblé5 individuals in two ways. The 
first uses the number of those potentially 
eligible for the credit based on a certain 
demographic characteristic. Due to data 
limitations, this characteristic is youth 
recipients of food stamps. The second es-
tímate uses the number of the eligible and 
newly hired, which eliminates those who 
are out of the labor force. She estimates 
a WOTC participation rate between 0.2 
and 3.3 percent for the potentially eligible 
and between 0.3 and 16.6 percent condi-
tional on them being new hires. The total 
eligible population for the WtW credit 
cannot be disentangled from those who 
could be claimed under the WOTC using 
SIPP data. As a compromise, Hamersma 
(2003) estimates a 1999 participation rate 
for a sample eligible for either the WOTC 
or the WtW: respondents who received at 
least nine months of welfare in the past 
18 months. Her estima tes are between 3.7 
and 5.7 percent for all individuals meet-
ing the welfare criteria and, conditioning 
on respondents who were new hires, she 
estimates the participation rate between 
9.3 and 32.4 percent. 
These estimates are comparable to the 
T}TC numbers estimated by Katz (1998). 
Using CPS and Department of Labor data 
from the mid to late 1980s, he estimates 
that nine percent of economically disad-
vantaged youth who were both eligible 
and employed were claimed under the 
credit. 
As the current research highlights, 
there are data limitations that prevent 
comprehensive studies of participation. 
It is impossible to identify the eligible 
population using survey data, along a 
number of dimensions, including cat-
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 
egorical eligibility. However, the most 
generous estimates suggest that fewer 
than one-third of all estimated eligible 
individuals participa te in the programs as 
they ha ve been designed. 
Influences 
Firms that may benefit more from the 
credits, because they hire more of the 
targeted employees, are more likely to file 
for the credit. The GAO (2002a) using IRS 
data show that corporations in retail trade, 
hotel and food services, and non-financia! 
services accounted for approximately 
three-quarters of total corporate WOTC 
dollars for 1999. The GAO reports that 
those knowledgeable about the WOTC, 
including federal and state government 
officials, report high utilization among 
retail and service businesses because 
of their high turnover and demand for 
low-skilled workers (GAO, 2002a).26 Like-
wise, Bishop and Kang (1991) find that 
employers paying low wages, employing 
low-skilled workers and offering non-
secure jobs were all significant determi-
nants of using the TJTC. 
The high costs of complying with the 
credit requirements may also influence 
utilization. For example, Hamersma (2003) 
points to evidence that the minimum-
hours requirement may be a major reason 
for the low participation in the WtW and 
WOTC credits. Her evidence comes from 
a GAO study, which showed that certified 
employees are often not employed long 
enough to meet the hours requirement to 
be claimed by the employer (Hamersma, 
2003). The persistent finding that larger 
firms are more likely to participation in 
these credits (GAO, 2002a; Bishop and 
Montgomery, 1986; Bishop and Mont-
gomery, 1993; Bishop and Kang, 1991) also 
suggest that compliance costs are a large 
25 This estimate is still on!y the potentially eligible because a firm must have tax liability to claim the credit. 
26 There is mixed evidence on whether firms "chum" employees, i.e., hire them for the mínimum amount of 
hours necessary to utilize the credit, befare releasing them (GAO, 2001a; Hamersma and Heinrich, 2004). 
768 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Federal lncome Tax Credits for Low-lncome Families 
influence on utilization. Bishop and Kang 
(1991) specifically find that firms better 
able to cover the fixed costs of participat-
ing beca use they have a personnel office or 
are a multi-establishment firm all suggest 
that compliance costs influence participa-
tion decisions. 
Bishop and Kang (1991) find that the fol-
lowing indicators of low incremental cost 
are significan! in determining use of the 
TJTC: lower-than-average wages (so the 
credit pays a larger percentage of the total 
wage bill), having fired an employee in the 
previous quarter, and being a non-union 
employer. 
Knowledge of the credit also seems 
to be a factor in firms taking the credit, 
although knowledge could clearly be en-
dogenous to the benefit of the firm taking 
the credit. Bishop and Montgomery (1986) 
find higher participation rates among 
employers who know of the credit. They 
also find that government outreach in the 
form of personal contact by a representa-
tive of a government agency or local busi-
ness organization is positively correlated 
with utilization. Employers who had 
been contacted by an outreach program 
were 63 percent more likely to participa te 
in TJTC than those who knew about the 
credit from another source, according to 
estima tes conducted by the Departrnent of 
Labor using a survey of 5,859 employers 
in 28labor markets. 
There is indirect evidence that the 
potential for employee stigma could also 
influence the participation rate in the em-
ployer-based tax credits. The issue is that 
employees have to identify themselves to 
employers as members of an at-risk group 
that is certifiable for the credit and this 
imposes a stigma cost on the employees 
being hired (see a summary in Dickert-
Conlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000)). 
Geographícally Targeted Tax Credíts 
Description 
There are two federal-leve! geographi-
cally targeted tax credits: Empowerment 
Zones (EZ) and Renewal Community 
(RC). The Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993 established the EZ, and 
the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 
2000 created the RC, which both provide 
credits to individual or corporate employ-
ers based on the census tract location of 
the employer and employees living in 
the area. The goal of these credits is to 
revitalize distressed urban and rural com-
munities through increased employment 
opportunities and wages for members of 
targeted communities. Generally, the EZ 
requires a minimum of 20- to 35-percent 
poverty levels and 6.3-percent unem-
ployment rates and the RC requires a 
minimum of 20-percent poverty levels 
and 9.45-percent unemployment rates 
(GAO, 2004). The only condition on the 
type of person hired for the firm is that 
the employee needs to live within the 
designated zone. A list of designated areas 
is found at www.irs.gov and http: 1 /www. 
ezec.gov 1 Communit/ ruralezec.htrnl. An 
employer can determine its own and its 
employees' eligibility through the Hous-
ing and Urban Development (www.hud. 
gov 1 crlocator) website or a toll-free 
number (IRS, 2004g). 
The EZ credit is for 20 percent of the 
first $15,000 in wages, for a maximum of 
$3,000, while the RC credit is for 15 per-
cent of the first $10,000 for a maximum of 
$1,500. The OMB (2005) estimates tax ex-
penditures of $1.08 billion in tax revenue 
from the EZ/EC27 and RC. 
To file for these credits, a firm must fill 
out form 8844, which involves reporting 
wages paid to the qualified employee and 
27 ECs are Enterprise Communities. They are geographically targeted areas that get a special allowance for 
depreciation and sorne further tax preference on offering bonds. OMB does not break down this estímate 
further. GAO (2002a) points out that the EZ/RC wage credit makes up the majority of the credit dollars. 
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showing that the firm had sorne tax liabil-
ity. 28 The actual paperwork is a page long 
and the document has instructions about 
how to check eligibility of an employee. 
Several states also ha ve credits available 
based on the geographic location of em-
ployees' homes and where they do most 
of their work. Most of these programs 
work similar to the federal program, and 
in fact use the same name as the federal 
program.29 
Utilization 
Estima tes 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the utiliza-
tion of the EZ and RC credits has grown 
extensively since 1995. The introduction 
of the RC in 2002 accompanied a dramatic 
jump in the number and dollar-amount 
of credits claimed by both individuals and 
corporations. The geographically targeted 
credits have no way of distinguishing if 
credit dollars are claimed for disadvan-
taged employees in the region. 
The GAO (1999) surveyed 2,400 em-
ployers in 1997 and found that 33 percent 
of large urban businesses, 70 percent of 
small urban businesses, and 47 percent 
of rural businesses indicated that they 
did not use any of the tax advantages of 
the EZ credit, including the wage credit, 
thatyear. 
The IRS can identify the number of 
firms claiming the credit; however, finding 
the number of firms eligible to claim the 
credit is not easy. The GAO (2004) cites the 
following matching problem. 
[A]ccording to IRS officials, the agency 
cannot reliably link businesses claiming 
the employment credit with specific 
EZs or RCs due to two factors. First, ac-
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 
cording to IRS officials the addresses 
business owners list on tax forms do not 
necessarily correspond with the location 
of their business operations, but may be 
a residence or the address where the busi-
ness is incorporated. Second, the IRS form 
used to claim the EZ and RC Employment 
Credits does not require the taxpayer to 
identify the EZ(s) or RC(s) where the busi-
ness operations eligible for the credit are 
located. (32-3) 
This matching problem makes it prohibi-
tively difficult to characterize the eligible 
population for each credit by location, so 
that meaningful participation rates are 
not available. 
Influences 
The GAO (1999) survey found that em-
ployers who did not use the tax incentives 
claimed that they either did not know 
about them (40 percent), did not qualify 
for them because the employees did not 
live in an EZ or were family members (35 
percent), did not have tax liability (five 
percent), or found them too complicated 
to use (eight percent). The remaining 
respondents either did not answer the 
question or gave other reasons. 
Like the categorically targeted tax cred-
its, there is evidence that employer size 
is positively correlated with using these 
geographically targeted credits, perhaps 
because the economies of scale lower 
the cost of complying. The GAO (1999, 
2004), in a 1997 survey of 2,400 employ-
ers in the nine original Empowerment 
Zones,30 finds that large urban employ-
ers were more likely than small urban 
employers to use the Empowerment Zone 
wage credit. Bershadker and Brashares 
28 This is a little more complicated for carry-forward credits used for previous years. 
29 GAO (2004) listsAlaska, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming as the only states that do not ha ve sorne sor! of geographically based credit for employ-
ers. Many of these states offer special credits for hiring or training employees in certain industries or other 
job-related credits that are not based on geographic location of employees. 
30 These include Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia /Camden, New York, the Kentucky Highlands, 
the Mississippi Mid-Delta, and the Rio Grande Valley in Texas. 
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(2000), using 1996 and 1997 IRS tax 
form data, show that among individuals 
claiming the credit, 22 percent have AGI 
over $500,000, but this represents over 
65 percent of the total amount of claims. 
Among corporations claiming the credit, 
18 percent of the corporate returns had 
assets over $100 million, and these 18 
percent represent 52 percent of the dollar 
amount claimed. 
The benefits may be largest to firms that 
are most likely to employ persons in these 
designated areas, and Bershadker and 
Brashares (2000) found that 61 percent of 
claiming firms report that their business 
is in manufacturing. 
Faulk (2001) examines the factors in-
fluencing a firm's decision to participate 
in Georgia's EZ program, the Job's Tax 
Credit GTC). The JTC, like the EZ credit, 
provides a tax credit to firms based on 
their county of location.31 The JTC, how-
ever, is only available for firms in certain 
industries, is based on the number of jobs 
created by the firm (instead of wages), 
and counts toward state lax liability. 
Using corporate income tax returns of 
firms that were eligible to take the credit 
and the Georgia Department of Labor's 
ES202 data to identify which ones actually 
took the credit, Faulk (2001) finds a high 
participation rate of 70 of the 151 firms in 
the sample. The analysis finds that the fol-
lowing were significant in determining if a 
firm claims the credit: having tax liability, 
previously taking the credit, employing 
more workers, the number of eligible jobs 
credited, being headquartered in Georgia, 
and being a "start up" firm. The results 
suggest that a lack of information and a 
small credit amount are the primary rea-
sons why the credit is not taken. 
In summary, almost nothing is known 
about the participation in geographi-
cally targeted EZ programs, except for the 
number of firms claiming the credit and 
the dollar amount of their credits. What 
little we know about the incentives to 
participation comes from a single study on 
a Georgia state program. Lack of data on 
eligible employees in an area and actual 
hires is the primary source of poor utiliza-
tion estima tes. 
UTILIZATION OF INCOME TAX 
CREDITS RELATIVE TO SOCIAL 
INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
Historically, social goals targeted at 
low-income individuals were more likely 
to be met through expenditure programs. 
Although the design and incentives may 
be quite different, the literature on utiliza-
tion of these programs may shed light on 
what influences take-up of tax credits. 
In sorne cases, the tax credits may be 
aimed at replacing welfare payments, so 
a clear understanding of the decisions to 
participate in these spending programs 
may be useful. 
Given that, historically, most social 
insurance programs for low-income in-
dividuals were entitlement programs de-
signed to provide short-term aid, the focus 
in the literature measuring participation 
is almost entirely on non-participation 
by eligible persons, rather than on how 
program design leaves sorne ineligible. 
Yet, like the tax credits, estimates of partici-
pation in social spending programs vary 
widely both across programs and across 
eligible subpopulations (Currie, 2004). 
One caveat to the work on participation 
is consistent with the tax credit research: 
data. Currie (2004) notes that survey data 
provide imprecise measures of the eligible 
population because of a lack of precise 
information about key variables such as 
assets, earnings or disability status. This, 
in, turn makes it difficult to estímate 
eligibility and utilization in spending 
programs. 
31 County characteristics, such as unernployrnent rate, average rnanufacturing wage, poverty rate, and perca pita 
incorne, determine the credit levels. 
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Often cited in the literature on utili-
zation of public programs are stigma, 
transaction costs, and lack of informa-
tion, which are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive explanations. Although 
the application and utilization systems 
in spending programs have the potential 
to play a larger role in participation deci-
sions, relative to tax credits, there is little 
empirical evidence that stigma does play 
a large role. Currie (2004) notes that there 
was no observable change in food-stamp 
participation rates after the introduction 
of electronic debit cards, which presum-
ably would reduce the stigma associated 
with program participation. 
However, there is a great deal of 
evidence that transaction costs are an 
important influence in the decision of 
those eligible to participate. Specifically, 
researchers find that when transactions 
costs are lowered, through means of less 
frequent recertification periods (Kabbani 
and Wilde, 2003), links with other spend-
ing programs (Ziliak, Gunderson and 
Figlio, 2003), and business-community 
involvement (Currie, 2004), participation 
is higher. For spending programs, an 
obvious business-community involve-
ment comes from, for example, health 
care providers seeking reimbursement 
for treatment. While, in the tax-credit 
system, the links are direct in the case of 
employer-based tax credits, they are indi-
rect in the case of tax preparation firms. 
There is sorne evidence that the lack 
of information may result in a lack 
of participation (see, for example, the 
Daponte, Osborne, Sanders and Taylor 
(1999) food-stamp study). However, 
Currie (2004) concludes that this reason 
may be more important in smaller pro-
grams than in larger ones. 
There is also evidence that when ben-
efits are higher, participation is higher. 
Beca use spending programs are tradition-
ally not tied to work, these links between 
characteristics and higher benefits are 
often the opposite of those for tax credits. 
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For example, participation tends to be 
counter cyclical, with higher participation 
when the economy is doing poorly (Blank 
and Wallace, 1999; Council of Economic 
Advisors, 1999; Currie and Grogger, 2001; 
Figlio and Ziliak, 1999; Ziliak et al., 2003). 
Blankand Ruggles (1996) find that a lower 
earnings potential dueto lower education 
and higher numbers of children is associ-
ated with higher participation. 
Overall, there is a tendency in the 
welfare literature to focus much more 
on the dynamic utilization of the pro-
grams (see Moffitt (1992) and Blank and 
Ruggles (1996)). Perhaps this is a func-
tion of the view that spending programs 
are temporary safety nets, rather than 
long-term systems of support. The ex-
isting work on the dynamic use of tax 
credits, including work by Altshuler 
and Schwartz (1996), Dowd (2005) and 
Horowitz (2005), highlights the severe 
data constraints facing researchers on 
this topic, but also suggests a productive 
avenue for future research. 
WHAT SHOULD THE UTILIZATION 
LOOK LIKE ANO HOW CAN WE GET 
THERE? 
Until now, this paper has provided a 
positive analysis of the utilization of tax 
credits among low-income individuals. 
The question of what utilization among 
low-income individuals should look 
like remains. The answer to this question 
depends, in part, on the goal of the tax 
credits. Assuming the goal is to redistrib-
ute income and/ or encourage behavior 
such as working and savings with the 
mínima! possible distortions, we proceed 
with sorne thoughts on what utilization 
should look like. 
Who? 
Presumably, the families with poor 
labor force participation records and 
those with long histories of welfare par-
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ticipation stand to gain the most from 
income transfers within the income-tax 
system. Utilized credits have obvious 
private and, potentially, social benefits. 
For example, credits tied to earnings or 
direct human capital investments, such as 
education, may raise the utility of the re-
cipient through higher income and greater 
self-sufficiency, but may also positively 
affect society by reducing dependency on 
government funded transfer programs, 
raising civic responsibility, increasing tax 
revenues, and producing gains in labor 
productivity and knowledge.32 Likewise, 
the utilization of credits that subsidize 
child-care expenses or encourage savings 
not only raises the disposable income 
of the recipients, but may again reduce 
dependency on government-funded pro-
grams such as welfare or social security. 
Child-care and savings credits may also 
have the potential to mitigate market 
failures arising from asymmetric infor-
mation such as the quality of child care 
or the need for income in old age, which 
could be efficiency-improving activities 
(Blau, 2003). Subsidizing child care may 
also benefit society by helping to produce 
more productive adults, assuming that 
more expensive child care is correlated 
with higher-quality child care (Gentry 
and Hagy, 1995). 
How? 
The question of how we should encour-
age utilization of tax credits brings us 
unavoidably to a discussion of tradeoffs. 
For example, policies that make the 
credits more accessible to the most needy 
individuals are expensive. In sorne cases, 
the particularly well-targeted credits 
come at the expense of making compli-
ance with the program prohibitively 
costly. The following discussion suggests 
ways of encouraging utilization, while 
addressing obvious tradeoffs in doing 
so. 
Well-Targeted 
Utilization should be well-targeted. 
Obviously, for low-income individuals to 
utilize tax credits aimed at accomplishing 
social policy, they must be eligible for the 
credit. On the individual tax side, non-
refundable tax credits will not reach the 
lowest-income individuals, who pay little 
or no federal income taxes. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the EITC, which is the only 
fully refundable credit in the individual 
tax code, has the highest estima tes of pro-
gram participation of any tax credit aimed 
at low-income taxpayers. The tradeoff to 
making a program more well-targeted 
at low-income individuals by allowing 
refundability is the cost of the program 
or resistance to using the tax system to 
accomplish social goals (Burman, 2003; 
Toder, 2000). 
At higher incomes, there are also trad-
eoffs in keeping the credits well-targeted. 
High marginal tax rates that phase out 
eligibility restrict credits to low-income 
individuals, which has the potential to 
discourage work. 
In an effort to keep the credits well-
targeted, many of the tax credits place 
strict categorical requirements on the 
taxpayers. For example, the education 
credits restrict the type of spending that 
qualifies for the Hope and Lifetime Learn-
ing Credit, and the Saver's Credit limits 
the credit value for those who received 
distributions from their retirement ac-
counts. Employers face strict requirements 
about who they can hire and how long 
those employees must work to qualify for 
the employer-based credits. The tradeoff 
is that many individuals and employers 
do not use the credits because they do 
32 Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (2003) show the potential for the EITC to raise the human capital of !hose who 
would otherwise not work, but lower the human capital investment of low-skilled individuals who choose 
work over human capital investment dueto the EITC. 
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not meet the strict requirements. The par-
ticipation rate in employer-based credits, 
such as the WOTC and WtW credits, are 
particularly low, perhaps in part due 
to these categorical restrictions. Even a 
highly utilized program like the EITC 
requires earned income, which implies 
that the program will not be used by those 
who are unable to work dueto disability 
or other factors. 
There is the possibility that tax credits 
are poorly targeted beca use of the timing 
of the encouraged behavior and the tax 
credit. If the goal is to increase utilization, 
the timing of tax credits may be a limita-
tion. Specifically, liquidity constraints 
may prevent individuals from engaging 
in the economic behavior that qualifies 
for a credit. For example, the educational 
tax credits provide reimbursement for 
college expenses in a lump-sum benefit, 
significantly after those expenses were 
incurred. The same is true for the child-
and dependent-care credit. As a result, 
those who may be in most need of as-
sistance do not ha ve the means to engage 
in the behavior because the program 
is administered through the tax system 
rather than through a federal agency. 
In contrast, there are fewer transaction 
costs associated with simply filing taxes 
once a year, rather than more frequently. 
In another sense, tax programs can pro-
vide a superior measurement of income 
because income is calculated on an an-
nual basis rather than over a shorter time 
period. Thus, tax programs may be able to 
differentiate between a more permanent 
low-income period and a temporary 
one. 
Simple 
To increase the utilization of these 
tax credits, they should be simple to 
claim, conditional on eligibility. This in-
eludes information about the existence of 
the credits and about how to actually 
file the credit. Evidence on the EITC, the 
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Saver's Credit, and the TJTC suggests 
that many individuals and firms do no 
not even know the programs exist. Even 
among individuals using credits, utiliza-
tion could be more effective if taxpayers 
were more informed. For example, evi-
dence on education credits suggests that 
individuals do not know which credits 
provide them with the largest benefits 
(GAO, 2005). 
One simplifying measure might include 
bundling credits together. Currie (2004) 
finds evidence that when applications 
for multiple welfare programs are inte-
grated, take-up among all those eligible 
may well increase. Currie (2004) also finds 
that there are spillover effects in utiliza-
tion between programs. There have been 
multiple calls or proposals for bundling 
tax credits to simplify the process. Cherry 
and Sawicky (2000), Ellwood and Liebman 
(2000), and Carasso, Rohaly, and Steuerle 
(2003) are a few of the recent proposals 
to either reform the EITC in combination 
with the dependent exemption and/ or the 
Child Tax Credit. 
A tradeoff to making the credits more 
accessible through refundability, reduc-
tion in categorical requirements, and 
increasing simplicity of filing is the poten-
tia! for increased non-compliance, either 
intentional or non-intentional. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much work that needs to 
be done in understanding how these 
tax programs are utilized, particularly 
if social programs continue to be pro-
vided through the tax system rather than 
through direct programs. It will be espe-
cially important to expand data collection 
efforts to get data needed to accurately 
assess participation. 
With the existing data, it appears that 
utilization is by far the largest for the 
EITC, possibly because it is the oldest of 
these programs, the only refundable pro-
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gram, and the best targeted at low-income 
individuals. Additionally, the EITC is the 
only program that does not require the 
individual to pay for a good or service, 
but instead provides an incentive to eam 
income. 
Utilization is low among low-income 
individuals in sorne of these tax credits 
because low-income individuals are not 
eligible. A redesign in these programs 
would result in the programs reaching 
those that they are ostensibly targeted to-
wards. In sorne cases, this means reducing 
complexity and administrative burdens, 
while, in others, it requires making these 
prograrns refundable or more generous so 
a "typical" low-income filer can actually 
claim a credit. 
Conditional on being eligible, one 
common factor associated with increasing 
participation in many of these programs 
is a high benefit-cost ratio and sophis-
tication with respect to the tax system, 
whether that be through the use of a paid 
preparer, higher education levels, or expe-
rience with the tax system. Policymakers 
should think creatively about reducing 
filing burdens to increase participation 
(e.g., through wider use of electronic 
filing). 
The big tradeoff to making these pro-
grams more accessible is the potential 
increase in utilization among individuals 
who are not eligible. There is little or no 
information on how program changes 
influence the intentional or unintentional 
non-compliance of these tax credits. 
Again, better data would help fill sorne 
of these gaps in our knowledge. 
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TaxProgram 
Eamed Income Tax Credit, an individual 
tax credit targeted at low-income workers. 
Blumenthal, Erard and Ho (2005) 
Fajnzylber (2004) 
Hill, Hotz, Mullin and Scholz (1999) 
Hirasuna and Stinson (2004) 
Hirasuna and Stinson (2005) 
Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2005) 
Participation Estimates 
69.4-74.3% 
64% 
42-84% 
61.0-68.8% 
N/ A 
N/ A 
APPENDIX TABLE lA 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CREDITS 
Data Used 
Blumenthal et al. estimated the number of eligible households from 
either 1988 IRS TCMPPhase Ill for tax filers and the 1988 IRS TCMP 
Phase IX Nonfiler Survey for tax nonfilers. EITC claims were based 
on IRS data on the number of 1988 EITC claims. 
Fajnzylber estimated the number of EITC-eligible units based on 
individuals in the AFOC/ TANF program between 1993 and 1999 in 
CaWomia, from Department of Soáal Services MediCal Eligibility 
Data, who had positive eamings, as reported to Califomia's Unem-
ployment lnsurance Program. The number of EITC claims was based 
on a match performed by Callfomia's Franchise Tax Board. 
Hill et al. use data from the California Work Pays Demonstration 
Project (CWPDP) for the number of AFOC assistance units from 
tour counties--Alameda, Los Angeles, San Bemardino and San 
Joaquin-and quarterly wage and salary information from the state's 
unemployment insurance records for the number of EITC-eligible 
individuals. EITC credits claimed comes from federal income tax 
returns for the years 1993 and 1994. 
Hirasuna and Stinson estima te the number of eligible claimants by 
merging data from the state of Minnesota's Department of Human 
Services, Department of Economic Security and Department of 
Revenue for the period 1995 to 1999. The number of actual claims 
was based on tax data from the Department of Revenue. 
Hirasuna and Stinson estima te their model based on data from the 
state of Minnesota for the period 1995 through 1999. Data from 
the Department of Human Services, Department of Revenue, and 
Department of Economic Security were merged with data from Ac-
countability Minnesota and the AARP on free tax preparation si tes. 
Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches estimated participation based on 1988 
through 1999 IRS tax retum data. 
Factors lnlluencing Partiápation 
Factors associated w:ith increasing participa !ion: larger 
benefits. 
Factors associated with increasing participation: tax 
preparation services; maximum benefit; improved 
county economic conditions; black; Hispanic. Factors 
associated with decreasing participation: single parent; 
young children. 
Factors increasing participation: use o f a paid preparer; 
recent entrants to welfare; two-parent households. 
Factors associated with increasing participation: resid-
ing in a suburban county; size of maximum credit; 
Asian Americans; older parents. Factors assodated 
with decreasing participation: residing in a rural 
county; less than a high school education. 
Factors increasing participation: free tax preparation 
sites in high-poverty areas; size of credit; income range 
of credit; female head; married. Factors decreasing 
participation: residing in surburban area; Hispanic; 
American Indian; less than a high school education; 
family size; age of household head. 
Factors associated with increasing participation: 
electronic filing. 
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Tax Program 
Scholz (1994) 
U .S. GAO (2001) 
U .S. lnternal Revenue Service (2002) 
Educational Tax Credits, tax credits 
targeted a t families with college 
students 
Hoblitzell and Smith (2001) 
Long(2004) 
APPENDIX TABLE lA (CONTINUED) 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CREDITS 
Participation Estimates Data Used 
75-131% Scholz used the 1990 SIPP, matched to tax retums, for the number 
of EITC-eligible tax units. For the number of EITC claims, Scholz 
used four different sources: 1) Creen Book estima tes, 2) Green Book 
estimates, adjusted by the 1988 1RS Taxpaye r Compliance Measure-
ment Program (TCMP), 3) IRS claims, and 4) 1990 SIPP self-reported 
information on participation in the EITC. Scholz a lso did a calculation 
adjusting the number of EITC-<!Iigible tax units by including those 
units that filed a 1040EZ and using lRS data to estimate the number 
ofclaims. 
75% The GAO used the 2000 March CPS to estima te the number of 
EITC-<>ligible recipients. The number of EITC claims was based on 
1999IRS data. 
64.2-73.5% 
78% 
27.3-29.4% 
The lRS used 1997 CPS data matched to tax retums for the number of 
EITC-eligible units. lRS tax data was used to calculate the number of 
EITC claims. The IRS also used 1997 SIPP to estima te the number of 
EITC-<!ligible units . 
Hoblitze ll and Smith estima te the number of ed ucation credit claims 
in the University of California system based on a survey. The number 
of eligible survey respondents is based on survey data matched to 
administrative data. 
Long estimated the number of educational tax credits based on 
self-reported use in the 1999-2000 NPSAS. The number of eligible 
students eligible for the educa tional tax credits was based on the 
1999-2000 NPSAS. 
Factors Influencing Participation 
Factors associated with increasing participation: larger 
benefits; married; residing in state with an income 
tax. Factors associated with decreasing participation: 
self--employment income; receipt of public assistance; 
larger family size; male; Hispanic; education; working 
in priva te household occupations. 
Factors associated with increasing participation: one or 
two qualifying children. 
Factors associated with increasing participation: 
income; credit size. Factors associated with decreasing 
participation: credit; residing in South or West region; 
residing in California, New York, Texas, or Florida; 
no qualifying children; not completing a high school 
education; Hispanic; receipt of public assistance. 
N/A 
Factors associated with increasing participation: female 
students; white students; married filers; parents wi th 
college experience. Factors associated with decreas-
ing participa tion: graduate students that relied less on 
federa l student a id programs. 
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Child and Dependen! Care Credit, 
a tax credit targeted at assisting 
parents with child ca re expenses 
while working 
Altshuler and Schwartz. (1996) 
Gentry and Hagy (1996) 
17.8% 
15.7-29.9% 
Altshuler and Schwartz used the University of Michigan panel of tax 
retum data for years 1979-1988. The number of eligible claimants 
is constructed by the number of retums claiming a dependen t. The 
number of claimants is the number of retums claiming the credit. 
Gentry and Hagy utilize the 1989 Child Care Survey to estimate 
participation rates by dividing the number of families that reported 
claiming the credit by the number of families with children under the 
age of 13 (the number of e ligible recipients). They also estima te par-
ticipation based on 1989 SOl data. In the SOl estimates, the numera-
ter is the number of retums claiming the credit and the denominator 
is the number of returns claiming a dependen t. 
NIA 
Factors associa ted with increased participation include 
younger children, higher levels of education for the 
mother, and use of child ca re centers o r family day ca re 
centers. Factors associated with decreased participation 
include larger family size. 
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TaxProgram 
CategoricaUy Targeted Employer 
Claimed Tax Credits 
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U.S GAO (2002) 
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Bishop and Kang (1991) 
Katz (1998) 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2A 
EMPLOYER CLAIMED IN COME TAX CREDITS 
Participation Estimates 
WOTC: 
0.2-3.3% All Eligible, 0.3-16.6% New 
Hires Only. WOTC & WtW: 0.9-5.7% All 
Eligible, 2.3-32.4% New Hires Only. 
1/ 750 corporations and 1/3450 individ-
uals with a business affiliation reported 
the WOTC on their retums in 1999. 
2.25% of firms surveyed participated in 
thel]TC. 
The total sample had a participation 
cate between 2.7 and 4.3%. Participa-
tion rates weighted by firm size range 
between 14.6% and 21.3% for the 1JTC. 
10% of eligible youth hired are claimed 
underl]TC. 
9% of economically disadvantaged 
youth who were both eligible and 
employed were daimed under the l]TC. 
Total numbers of EZ wage credits are 
reported; no participation rate is given. 
Data Used 
Department of Labor Certifications and SIPP 
IRS Statistics of lncome sample for 1999 
Department of Labor survey of 5,859 employers in 28 
labor markets 
Factors lnfluencing Participation 
Larger Firms, corporations in retail trade, hotel and food 
services, and non-financia) services. 
Size of establishment, flexibility in firing employees, 
non-union firms, learning about the credit from a 
govemment representative, past participation, unskilled 
work available conditional on knowledge of the credit. 
Surveys conducted by lnstitute for Research on Poverty Not Discussed 
and National Center for Research in Vocational Educa-
tion of 3,412 employers. 
1982 survey by the National Center for Research in 
Vocational Education conducted by Gallup Organization 
of emp loyers. 
Department of Labor certifications, unpublished tabula-
tions from U.S House of Representa ti ves. CPS was used 
to calcula te the popu1ation of economically disadvan-
taged youth. 
IRS's Statistics of Income databases of corporate and 
individual tax returns for 1995 through 2001. (Samples 
of tax retums.) 
Pre--1981: Offering new employees more than standard 
training, offering less specific training, low capital invest-
ment per worker, lower than average wage rates, having 
fired an employee in 4th quarter 1979. After 1981: Being 
non-union, having higher capital investments per em-
ployee, not having fired an employee in 4th quarter 1979. 
Regulatory Burden, lack of support by administering 
agencies, stigma for targeted workers. 
Cited results of survey from 1999 GAO report. 
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U.S GAO (1999) 
Bershadker and Brashares (2000) 
Faulk (2001) 
~ 
According to the survey response, 42% 
of the large urban businesses, 6% of 
the small urban businesses, and 32% of 
the rural businesses used the EZ wage 
credit. 
Numbers of filers and credit dollar 
amounts are given. 
46.35% (70/151) of eligible firms took 
Georgia's Job Tax Credit. 
GAO' s own mailed survey to 2,400 businesses in the nine 
original empowerment zones. 
A special extract of IRS Individual Master File is used 
as well as the Empowerment Zone Supplement to the 
Corporate SOl sarnple. 
Georgia Departrnent of Labor ES202 data identifies 
which firms took the credit. Corporate income tax 
returns show firms that were eligible to take the credit. 
The survey differentiated by size of firm and urban vs. 
rural dassification. Knowledge of the credit as well as 
having eligible employees also were major factors of 
respondents who gave reasons for not using the credit. 
Claimants are characterized by AGI for individuals and 
total assets for corporate retums. 
Probability of participation increased with: tax liability, 
decreased size of firm, if the firm had previously taken 
the credit, and if the number of jobs credited increased. 
Participation decreased with: larger firms, firms not head-
quartered in Georgia, and firms that were start-ups. 
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